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TOWARD ENDING RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION: A FAIR SHARE PROPOSAL
FOR THE NEXT RECONSTRUCTION
JOHN CHARLES BOGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The keenest scholars who have written on residential segregation in
the post-Kerner Commission era agree on two things: Segregation has
devastating social consequences, and it is apparently intractable. Their
deep pessimism stems in part from their doubt that Americans will ever
summon the political will to end segregation. In larger measure, how-
ever, their writings reflect uncertainty whether effective governmental
policies can be fashioned to overcome metropolitan racial divisions. In a
nation unwilling to dictate housing choices to the private market, all gov-
ernmental policies to promote racial or economic integration must con-
front the harsh judgments of the marketplace, where housing consumers
are free to leave (or refuse to enter) an integrating community, thereby
assuring its resegregation.
This Essay proposes a policy tool, a National Fair Share Act, that
would create new market incentives to support integrative housing
choices and provide market disincentives to discourage segregative
choices.1 The legislation has three features:
(i) Drawing upon lessons learned from the nation's attempt to end
racial segregation in voting, public education, and employment, and from
New Jersey's experience with "fair share" housing legislation, the Act
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. 1968,
Duke University; M.Div. 1971, Yale Divinity School; J.D. 1974, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill. My special thanks to law students Lisa Frye, Leigh Mcafee, Lee Robinson,
and Alfred Walker for their fine research assistance on this essay.
1. The central features of the Fair Share legislation have several predecessors. In a mag-
isterial article, James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal Analysis of
Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979),
Professor Kushner suggested a variant of this proposal, although without exploring its poten-
tial for redirecting market incentives. Id. at 671-75. Professor Derrick Bell recently has mused
about a "Racial Preference Licensing Act," under which governments would redirect market
forces by licensing racially discriminatory conduct in exchange for payment of a fee that would
be used to underwrite black economic development. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47-52 (1991); see also Michelle J. White, Sub-
urban Growth Controls: Liability Rules and Pigovian Taxes, 8 J. LEGAL STUDIES 207, 225-30
(1979) (suggesting that suburban exclusionary zoning regulations should be taxed to offset
their external social and economic costs).
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would require the designation of concrete housing goals for every munic-
ipality that has not yet assumed its "fair share" of racially and economi-
cally integrated housing.
(ii) As an incentive, the Act would promise to disperse new federal
housing funds through state governments to all municipalities that
choose to shoulder their "fair share" housing obligations. As a disincen-
tive, this legislation would modify the federal tax code so that property
holders in municipalities that choose to ignore their prescribed housing
goals would progressively lose their mortgage interest and property tax
deductions. These tax code modifications would have a dual purpose:
First, to prompt citizens to encourage municipalities to comply with fed-
eral law, thereby hastening metropolitan integration; second, to reverse
the economic advantages that currently flow toward property holders in
segregated communities.
(iii) Mindful that local participation is crucial to success, the legisla-
tion would grant local municipalities great flexibility in devising plans to
meet their fair share obligations. Moreover, as amplified below, the legis-
lation would permit each municipality to opt for an integration emphasis
or a low-income housing emphasis.
Before examining the specifies of the National Fair Share proposal,
this Essay will briefly contrast the basic remedial strategy of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (the principal federal statute available to combat
housing segregation) with strategies embodied in three other civil rights
statutes (the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Titles VI and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964), each of which has proven more effective in
achieving compliance. Next it will examine a housing strategy that ap-
proximates the successful approach of the federal voting, public educa-
tion, and employment statutes-the "fair share" housing legislation
developed in New Jersey during the 1980s. After noting several weak-
nesses in the New Jersey legislation, the Essay will introduce a strength-
ened alternative, the National Fair Share Act.
A. The Persistence of Residential Segregation
In 1968, the Kerner Commission warned that America's residential
areas were drifting toward racial polarization: The nation's central cities
were disproportionately becoming home to an impoverished, African-
American2 minority, while the growing suburbs increasingly were popu-
2. Editor's Note: The contributors to this symposium have used the terms "African
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North Carolina Law Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
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lated by a more prosperous white majority.3 The Commission cautioned
that this residential isolation would inflict grave economic disadvantage
on African Americans,4 and simultaneously would spell social and eco-
nomic decline for many American cities.5
As the Introduction to this Special Issue reveals, subsequent devel-
opments largely have confirmed the Kerner prognosis: Urban geography
apparently has contributed substantially in the intervening twenty-five
years to the maintenance, if not the intensification, of racial subordina-
tion.6 Although the starkness of the present residential apartheid is ob-
scured by the visible progress of a minority of African Americans who
have attained uneasy middle-class economic status, 7 even this black mid-
dle class has not experienced the degree of residential mobility that
should have accompanied their economic success.8 Moreover, residential
segregation continues to confine most blacks in urban areas to employ-
ment and housing markets that are economically inferior;9 many live in
3. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1-2, 10 (Bantam
Books 1968).
4. Id. at 23-29.
5. Id. at 21-23. Fourteen of America's 25 largest cities decreased in population between
1970 and 1980. Anthony Downs, The Future of Industrial Cities, in THE NEW URBAN REAL-
ITY 281, 281 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985). Long-term decline is predicted for many larger,
older cities, especially in the Northeast and North Central states. Id. at 282-83. Those Ameri-
can cities currently in decline, moreover, contain relatively higher percentages of African
Americans. For example, in the 14 declining cities mentioned above, African Americans com-
prised 34.4% of the population; among central cities as a whole, African Americans constitute
a much smaller percentage, only 22.5%. Id. at 281.
6. See generally John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commis-
sion in Retrospect, An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289 (1993) (suggesting that, despite
significant achievements, urban blacks still lag far behind suburban whites in employment
rates, average income, and access to quality education, health care, housing, and other social
services).
7. See REYNOLDS FARLEY & RICHARD R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUAL-
ITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 289-90 (1987). Farley and Allen note that middle-income blacks in
the mid-1980s were far less secure in their overall economic circumstances than were
equivalent middle-income whites, in part because of significantly lower levels of total wealth:
"[R]acial differences in wealth are very much greater than racial differences in current income.
... [B]lack households in late 1984 had monthly incomes which were 62 percent of those of
white households, but their median assets were only 9 percent of those of whites." Id.
8. ROBERT W. LAKE, THE NEw SUBURBANITES: RACE AND HOUSING IN THE SUB-
URBS 239 (1981) ("The suburbanization of blacks is being accompanied by the increasing terri-
torial differentiation of suburbia along racial lines-and not by integration."); see also GARY
ORFIELD & CAROLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY & BLACK
OPPORTUNITY 69-102 (1991) (reporting that Atlanta's housing market is racially segregated at
all income levels); Phillip L. Clay, The Process of Black Suburbanization, 14 URB. AFF. Q. 405,
416-19 (1979) (describing the persistence in suburban communities, at all but the highest in-
come levels, of a "racially segmented housing market").
9. See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner, Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: Lessons
from Fair Housing Audits, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 185, 210 (1992).
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segregated neighborhoods that are debilitated by private disinvestment °
and are underserved by grossly inadequate education, health care, public
safety, and other municipal services."1
B. Residential Segregation-An "Inevitable Consequence?"
One of the most striking aspects of racial segregation in 1993 is the
national sense that it is inescapable. Despite hard-won legal successes
against other forms of racial discrimination in public and private life,12
residential segregation is widely viewed as an "inevitable consequence" of
economic inequality between blacks and whites, of the private prefer-
ences of minority renters and homeowners, or of inexorable sociological
and economic forces.
Those who point to income differences between blacks and whites or
to black neighborhood preferences in explaining residential segregation
rarely find it problematic. These observers view segregation as a by-
product of our American commitment to free markets and private
choices.3 A careful review of the evidence demonstrates, however, that
neither income inequality nor African-American preferences suffice to
10. Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Under-
class, 96 AM. J. Soc. 329, 345 (1990) (noting that racially and economically segregated neigh-
borhoods are often so fragile that normal economic downturns "rapidly bring about the failure
of most nonessential businesses and the elimination of services that depend on the ability of
clients to pay").
11. In their careful study of residential mobility in Philadelphia, Douglas Massey and his
colleagues report that middle-class blacks "have a difficult time achieving a spatial outcome
commensurate with their [socioeconomic status]." Douglas Massey et al., Effects of Residen-
tial Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being, 66 Soc. FORCES 29, 42 (1987).
"[P]atterns of residential segregation have separated blacks and whites [in Philadelphia] into
two vastly different environments: one that is poor, crime-ridden, unhealthy, unsafe, and edu-
cationally inferior, and another that is markedly richer, safer, healthier, and educationally
superior." Id. See Boger, supra note 6, at 1321-31.
12. See, eg., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-a6 (1988)) (outlawing racial discrimination in public accommodations),
2000c-c9 (in public education), 2000d-d7 (in federally assisted programs), 2000e (in private
employment)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-4 (1988)) (in voting rights)); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (in federal employment); Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-
1970), superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970) (by federal
contractors).
13. Of course, any justification of residential segregation that relies upon present differ-
ences in the economic status of blacks and whites must respond to evidence that residential
location itself is a crucial factor in determining a resident's economic success. See, e.g., George
C. Galster & Mark Keeney, Race, Residence, Discrimination & Economic Opportunity, 24
URB. AFF. Q. 87 (1988); John F. Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades
Later, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBAT 371 (1992).
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explain current patterns of housing segregation. 4 While black citizens,
on average, have lower incomes (and thus less residential mobility) than
whites, blacks at all income levels continue to face widespread exclusion
from neighborhoods they can afford.15 Indeed, housing discrimination
against blacks remains far more pronounced than that confronted by
other ethnic groups, including non-black Hispanics and Asians in similar
economic circumstances.16 Nor do minority housing preferences-the
"birds of a feather" explanation-adequately explain America's segre-
gated living patterns. Numerous attitudinal studies confirm that a sub-
stantial majority of African Americans would prefer to live in racially
integrated residential neighborhoods if they could move without threats
of violence or hostility from their new neighbors. 7
Two other theories, less benign than income differences or black
neighborhood preferences, offer more plausible explanations for
America's continuing housing segregation: (1) illegal housing discrimi-
14. Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The
Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 874, 885-88 (1988).
15. John 0. Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The Necessary & Proper Aspirations of Fair
Housing, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1989, at 77, 90-95 (1989) (pointing out that
levels of black residential segregation remain high irrespective of education or income); George
C. Gaster, Residential Segregation in American Cities: A Contrary Review, 7 POPULATION
RES. & POL'Y REV. 93, 95 (1988) (noting "a clear-cut consensus" in the research that "interra-
cial differences in income (i.e., the affordability of housing) alone explain relatively little of the
observed segregation"); Kain, supra note 13, at 450 (finding that "very little of the intense
segregation of Afro-American households, or their serious underrepresentation in suburban
areas, is explained by low incomes or other socioeconomic differences between them and ma-
jority households").
16. See, eg., Nancy A. Denton & Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation of Blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 Soc. Scl. Q. 797, 807 (1988)
(noting that Hispanics and Asians, unlike African Americans, have experienced decreases in
residential segregation as their socioeconomic status has risen; indeed, residential segregation
from whites remains higher among college-educated blacks than among Hispanics with zero-
to-four years of education); John E. Farley, Segregation in 1980: How Segregated Are
America's Metropolitan Areas?, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RA-
CIAL SEGREGATION 95, 104-07 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987) [hereinafter DIVIDED NEIGHBOR-
HOODS] (observing that Hispanics in general are significantly less segregated than blacks, and
that Hispanic segregation levels have declined more over time).
17. See, e.g., Mittie Olion Chandler, Obstacles to Housing Integration Program Efforts, in
THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK & WHITE: PLACE, POWER & POLARIZATION 286, 287 (George
C. Galster & Edward W. Hill eds., 1992) [hereinafter BLACK & WHITE] (reporting a 1985
survey in Cleveland in which 65% of black respondents indicated that neighborhoods with an
even distribution of blacks and whites were ideal); Joe T. Darden, Choosing Neighbors and
Neighborhoods: The Role of Race in Housing Preference, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 16, at 15, 26 (concluding that surveys of blacks "indicate a black preference for mixed or
half-black half-white neighborhoods and the rejection of all black and all white ones"); Reyn-
olds Farley et al., "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs:" Will the Trend toward Racially Separate
Communities Continue?, 7 Soc. Sm. REs. 319, 328-31 (1978) (reporting on a Detroit study that
found a majority of blacks favor integrated neighborhoods).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nation perpetuated nationwide against African-American home seekers;
and (2) widespread refusal by white home seekers to buy or rent in ra-
cially integrated communities. Strong evidence exists that America's
housing sales and rental markets, and perhaps its mortgage lending mar-
kets as well, are rife with illegal discriminatory behavior. II The Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has sponsored two
major studies of housing discrimination, completed in 1979 and 1989 re-
spectively.19 The more recent HUD study found that African-Ameri-
cans can expect to experience discrimination in fifty-nine percent of their
home sales encounters and fifty-three percent of their leasing en-
counters.20 This massive pattern of illegal conduct, which persists in de-
fiance of federal statutes passed in 1968, has denied millions of black
citizens access to municipalities and neighborhoods in which whites have
invested their housing dollars.
Additionally, there is strong evidence that whites regularly decline
to seek housing in communities where blacks currently reside or are
likely to move in great numbers.21 While some whites doubtless do so
because of racial prejudice, others claim that racial integration inevitably
leads to a decline in property values and an increase in local taxation.22
Whether or not empirically correct,23 such beliefs tend to become self-
fulfilling prophesies, for when potential white home buyers shun commu-
nities that welcome integration, the market demand for housing in those
communities, and perforce, the market value of those homes and apart-
ments, tends to decline.2 4
18. See, eg., George C. Galster, Racial Discrimination in Housing Markets During the
1980s: A Review of the Audit Evidence, 9 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 165 (1990) (reviewing over
70 housing discrimination studies, most of which found racial discrimination); Turner, supra
note 9, at 201-10 (describing widespread discrimination against blacks and Hispanics by real
estate sales and rental agents); Ronald E. Wienk, Discrimination in Urban Credit Markets:
What We Don't Know and Why We Don't Know It, 3 HOUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 217 (1992)
(acknowledging the existence, though not the extent, of mortgage and other credit
discrimination).
19. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYN-
THESIS (1991); RONALD E. WIENK ET AL., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERI-
CAN HOUSING MARKETS: THE HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY (1979).
20. TURNER, supra note 19, at vii.
21. Farley et al., supra note 17, at 336.
22. ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA 68-70 (1973) (cataloging eight principal white objections to residential integration,
the first three of which are a likely rise in property taxes, a likely increase in federal taxes, and
a fear of falling property values).
23. John Stahura, Rapid Black Suburbanization of the 1970s: Some Policy Considerations,
18 POL'Y STUD. J. 279, 288 (1989-1990) (analyzing 1980 Census data which suggest that black
municipal population growth does not lead to tax increases and, in fact, has a positive effect on
housing values).
24. See George C. Galster, The Case for Racial Integration, in BLACK & WHITE, supra
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This socio-economic explanation of the segregative process is partic-
ularly sobering, for it implies that, even if every illegal act of discrimina-
tion could somehow be successfully interdicted, whites prompted by
private market incentives would continue to make perfectly legal housing
choices that, cumulatively, would lead to segregated neighborhoods. In a
country firmly committed to private markets and to freedom of move-
ment (for those with sufficient capital), no governmental remedy against
segregation can ever succeed without sufficiently altering housing market
forces to induce millions of blacks and whites with enough assets to exer-
cise a range of housing choices to change their behavior and choose ra-
cially desegregated communities.2"
It is thus little wonder that many students of residential segregation,
as noted above, concur in the gloomy belief that segregated living pat-
terns are all but inevitable in the foreseeable future.26 Not only do polit-
note 17, at 270, 278-79. Thomas Schelling's much-debated "tipping" model suggests that even
if both whites and blacks are willing to live in racially integrated communities, eventual
resegregation is inevitable so long as there are any systematic differences in the percentage of
integration that whites and blacks will accept. Thomas Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segrega-
tion, 1 J. MATHEMATIC SOC'Y 143, 181-86 (1971). Although the assumptions of Schelling's
model have been strongly challenged, see Galster, supra note 15, at 100-02, the real-world
difficulties experienced by those communities that are committed to maintaining a multi-racial
population suggest that some variant of Schelling's phenomenon may be at work in many
communities that undergo racial transition. See, e.g., Alexander Polikoff, Sustainable Integra-
tion or Inevitable Resegregation, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 43, 43-
56 (John M. Goering ed., 1986) (describing problems with racial stabilization programs);
Chandler, supra note 17, at 291-302 (same).
25. See Sander, supra note 14, at 902-03.
26. Anthony Downs' 1973 classic, Opening Up the Suburbs, remains the most powerful
argument for residential desegregation. Recently, as the twentieth anniversary of his work
approached, Downs observed:
I am skeptical that truly equal racial housing outcomes can be achieved as long as
residential areas remain segregated by race. Nevertheless, the obvious, persistent,
and widespread white antipathy to racial residential integration makes it unlikely
that this condition will be attained on any really large scale in my lifetime.
Anthony Downs, Policy Directions Concerning Racial Discrimination in U.S. Housing Markets,
3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 685, 688 n.1 (1992) [hereinafter Downs, Policy Directions].
John Goering also remarked:
It is appalling how little is known, how little has been effective, and how mountain-
ous are the obstacles to change. The costs of segregation are so severe, and the pace
of change so dreadfully slow, that one can despair of any progress within the next
decades.... I suspect that progress will occur only in small steps and that watershed
victories are unlikely.
John Goering, Concluding Remarks, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY,
supra note 24, at 327, 333; see also Gary A. Tobin, Introduction: Housing Segregation in the
1980s, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 16, at 8, 14 (voicing a similar expectation);
John Yinger, On the Possibility ofAchieving Racial Integration Through Subsidized Housing, in
HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 24, at 290, 306-07 (same).
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ical forces seem aligned against effective reform,27 but even the law
appears relatively powerless to combat residential segregation directly,
because of our commitment to private choice in housing markets. Thus,
Anthony Downs notes:
[R]esidential segregation by race can and does arise because of
factors that are not illegal, but voluntary (though illegal behav-
ior may contribute to it). Such segregation is relatively easy to
detect, but it cannot be attacked per se, as can racially discrimi-
natory behavior. Such segregation arises because of the collec-
tive results of many individual actions that are not illegal and,
hence cannot be directly discouraged through fines and punish-
ment. Moreover, public support for antisegregation actions is
not nearly as strong or widespread as public support for an-
tidiscrimination actions....
This analysis indicates that policies designed to reduce residen-
tial segregation by race are not likely to be nearly as effective in
achieving their goal-at least in the near future-as those
designed to reduce racially discriminatory behavior in housing
market transactions.28
Downs' analysis leads him and other commentators to advocate more of
the same-vigorous enforcement of fair housing laws, hoping somehow
to deter market actors from actively discriminating against minority citi-
zens who seek integrated housing opportunities.29
27. Anthony Downs made the point quite bluntly:
[T]he white-dominated U.S. society has clearly chosen to create and maintain two
racially separate and unequal societies, as the Kerner Commission feared it might.
In spite of all pious statements to the contrary, the leaders and citizens of nearly all
parts of U.S. society have no intention whatever of changing that deliberate pol-
icy....
If this conclusion is correct, there is no point in advocating racial integration as
the central social strategy for coping with big-city problems .... This is the best
approach in theory, and perhaps marginal progress can be made in pursuing it. But
the political leaders of all large metropolitan areas do not have the slightest interest
in pursuing this strategy in any meaningful way. This is true both of most white
leaders, who want to maintain their basically segregated neighborhoods, and most
black leaders, who want to preserve the political power that comes from concentrat-
ing minorities within the central city.
Downs, supra note 5, at 289-90.
28. Downs, Policy Directions, supra note 26, at 725.
29. Id. at 739-42. Downs is joined in this emphasis by George Galster, who has urged a
redirection of fair housing toward "collective modes of enforcement," including more aggres-
sive and well-funded "testing" to be conducted by public agencies and fair housing organiza-
tions. GEORGE C. GALSTER, FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING POLICY IN THE 1980s: THE GREAT
MISAPPREHENSION 17-23 (MIT Center for Real Estate Development Working Paper No. HP-
5, 1988).
1580 [Vol. 71
19931 THE URBAN CRISIS 1581
The National Fair Share proposal aims to accomplish what Downs
says cannot be done: to "attack segregation per se."30 While it neither
outlaws segregation entirely nor dictates private housing choices, it does
place on local municipalities an affirmative burden to end segregation. It
also imposes sharp economic costs on residents of municipalities that do
not comply, thereby changing the economic calculus for potential renters
and home buyers. This proposal is not modest in scope, for it requires
combined action by the federal government, each of the states, and
thousands of municipalities. Nor is it cost-free. The federal government
would be required to increase its national investment in subsidized hous-
ing, which has dwindled under the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
and it also would be required to provide funds for planning and technical
assistance to the states. Yet at bottom, the Act eschews a massive, fed-
eral housing production program in favor of a more manageable redirec-
tion of the nation's ongoing residential growth in directions that
eventually should bridge the racial chasm that currently divides us.
Moreover, the Act borrows key elements from proven legislative strate-
gies that have succeeded in implementing civil rights goals in other
contexts.
II. ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL RACIAL STRATEGY
A. The Deficiency of a Case-by-Case Approach
The Fair Housing Act of 196831 is the principal federal statute
designed to combat residential discrimination.32 Enacted in the wake of
30. An effective legal response cannot rely directly on constitutional remedies. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that private choices leading to segregated residential com-
munities, if not the product of government action, do not directly violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, requiring judicial intervention.
Where resegregation [of public schools] is a product not of state action but of private
[residential] choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the
authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract
these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts.... Residential housing
choices.., present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address through judicial
remedies.
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992).
Congress nonetheless has broad authority under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to legislate against racial ills. See, eg., Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (upholding the power of Congress under 42 U.S.C.§ 1982 to outlaw private acts of racial discrimination in the sale or leasing or real property);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding a provision of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 that barred New York's imposition of an English literacy requirement on Spanish-
speaking voters in a state election).
31. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988
& Supp. 111990)).
32. Several other federal statutes, most notably the Housing and Community Develop-
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the Kerner Commission Report and the assassination of Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. in 1968,11 the Act prohibits acts of racial (or religious)
discrimination by governmental and most private actors in the sale or
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-
5320 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)), profess to aim at "the reduction of the isolation of income
groups within communities and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the
diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing oppor-
tunities for persons of lower income." 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (1988). As originally enacted,
the Housing and Community Development Act required localities to develop three-year com-
prehensive plans to meet community development needs, as well as "Housing Assistance
Plans" (HAPs) to assess the present and future housing needs of lower-income persons and to
specify how the municipalities intended to meet their housing needs. Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 104(a)(1)-(4), 88 Stat. 633, 638 (amended by
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 384,
384 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (1988))). HAPs were to be reviewed and
certified by regional and state planning clearinghouses following an "A-95 review" process.
Id. The failure to receive certification of a HAP theoretically precluded a municipality from
receipt of its share of the $8.3 billion in Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs)
authorized under the Act. Id. §§ 104(a), (e), 88 Stat. at 638, 640. See generally Duane P.
Landreth, Four Elements-Planning, Citizen Participation, Housing Assistance and A-95 Re-
view-Under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 9 URB. LAW. 61
(1977) (describing the Act's operation and its predecessor programs).
Yet the text of the Housing and Community Development Act does not speak in express
racial terms, and the Act provides several avenues by which suburban municipalities can avoid
participation in the federal effort to "spatially deconcentrate" low-income and minority hous,
ing. See 42 U.S.C. § 1439(c) (1988) (requiring HUD to notify a municipality and allow 30
days for expression of local disapproval before federally assisted housing can be placed in a
community). In addition, the 1974 Act contained only a vague general requirement that appli-
cants for CDBG funds give "maximum feasible priority" to activities that would benefit low-
or moderate-income families or aid in the elimination of slums or blight. Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§ 104(b)(2), 88 Stat. 633, 639 (amended by Housing and Community Development Amend-
ments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 384, 384 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5304(a) (1988))). In fact, HUD is directed to approve all applications for CDBG funds
unless either the applicant's self-description of its needs and objectives appears "plainly incon-
sistent" with available data, id. § 104(c)(1), 88 Stat. at 639, or unless the applicant's plan for
use of CDBG funds is "plainly inappropriate" in light of HUD's plan. Id. § 104(c)(2), 88 Stat.
at 639. As if to make the point more clearly, the Act stated its intention to provide communi-
ties funds "on an annual basis, with maximum certainty and minimum delay." Id. § 101(d)(1),
88 Stat. at 635.
Many commentators have judged the implementation of the Act a failure, arguing that
HUD's enforcement has betrayed whatever strict emphasis on assisting low-income citizens or
achieving racial desegregation that may have been contemplated originally by Congress.
Calmore, supra note 15, at 87; John 0. Calmore, Fair Housing vs. Fair Housing: The Problems
with Providing Increased Housing Opportunities Through Spatial Deconcentration, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7, 10-12 (1980); Mittie Olion Chandler, Public Housing Desegregation:
What Are the Options?, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 509, 522 (1992); Herbert Franklin et al.,
Inclusionary Programs and the Larger Public Interest, in AFrER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEw
SUBURBAN ZONING 299, 301 (Jerome G. Rose & Robert E. Rothman eds., 1977) [hereinafter
AFTER MOUNT LAUREL]; Kushner, supra note 1, at 589-90 & nn.95-97.
33. Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8
WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1969).
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rental of multi-family dwellings.34 The Fair Housing Act also requires
HUD and other federal agencies to "administer their programs and ac-
tivities relating to housing and urban development ... affirmatively to
further the purposes of" fair housing.35
By most accounts, the Fair Housing Act has been a disappointing
failure.36  Until 1988, when substantial legislative revisions were
adopted,37 the Act provided injured parties only trivial economic incen-
tives to initiate corrective lawsuits.3 8 Moreover, federal authorities were
given very limited authority to pursue independent federal enforcement
efforts.39 Although the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act have
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) & (b) (1988). The Act also prohibits discrimination in the adver-
tisement, financing, or commercial brokerage of housing units. Id. §§ 3604(c), 3605-3606.
35. Id. § 3608(d).
36. See, eg., GALSTER, supra note 29, at 14-17; James A. Kushner, An Unfinished
Agenda: The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 348, 351-55
(1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2174-78 ("Twenty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, dis-
crimination and segregation in housing continue to be pervasive.").
37. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-3608, 3615-3619, 3631 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 2341-2342 (1988)); see
James A. Kushner, Federal Enforcement and Judicial Review of the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988, 3 HOUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 537, 548-59 (1992).
38. Prior to 1988, the Fair Housing Act limited successful parties to the recovery of their
actual damages and a maximum of $1000 in punitive damages. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812(c),
82 Stat. 73, 88 (amended by Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102
Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-3608, 3615-3619, 3631 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 2341-
2342 (1988))). Since the principal damages in such cases are often dignitary injuries, not out-
of-pocket losses, this provision served as a severe financial disincentive to parties trying to
decide whether to undergo the expense and uncertainties of litigation. Moreover, even though
Title VIII cases often are difficult to litigate and large recoveries are rare, the statute provided
that attorneys fees would be awarded only to those prevailing parties who could demonstrate
that they were "not financially able to assume said attorney's fees." IdL The pre-litigation
conciliation provisions of the 1968 Act, id. §§ 810(d), 812(a), 88 Stat. 86, 88, were often inef-
fective as well. Professor Kushner reports that, in 1988, of the 4658 housing discrimination
complaints filed with HUD, only 214 were conciliated successfully by HUD itself, with an-
other 908 conciliations achieved by state and local fair housing authorities, for a total of only
1123 successful conciliations out of 4658 original complaints filed with HUD. Kushner, supra
note 37, at 538 n.7.
Aggrieved parties theoretically have available another legal remedy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1988), a surviving remnant of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which allows the recovery
of attorneys' fees and punitive damages. However, success under § 1982 requires proof of the
defendant's intent to discriminate, often a difficult burden to meet.
39. Apart from conciliation responsibilities under §§ 808-810, the 1968 Act gave HUD
independent enforcement powers only if HUD found "reasonable cause to believe that any
person... is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance," and only if "such denial raise[d]
an issue of general public importance." Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 813(a), 82 Stat. 73, 78 (amended
by Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3602-3608, 3615-3619, 3631 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 2341-2342 (1988))).
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addressed many of these deficiencies,' other problems remain or have
arisen.41
More centrally, the Fair Housing Act retains an inherent flaw: It is
built upon a tort or criminal liability model that requires the identifica-
tion of a violation, the detection of a perpetrator, and proof at trial that
the perpetrator's act has violated the federal housing statutes.42 Yet,
realtors, lenders, or sellers rarely reveal their intent to discriminate, and
most injured parties remain unaware that the law has been violated.43
Various steps could (and should) be taken to improve the efficacy of the
Fair Housing Act-aggressive use of "testing" or housing audit methods
to detect misconduct,' more vigorous enforcement by federal authorities
armed with a larger enforcement budget,45 and increased financial assist-
40. James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Genera-
tion of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1087-92 (1989). The 1988 Amendments have
lifted the cap on punitive damages, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1988), and made attorneys' fees
more readily available. Id. § 3613(c)(2). The Amendment now contemplates the option of
court-appointed attorneys for plaintiffs in their litigation against offenders under the Act. Id.
§ 3613(b)(1).
41. Professor Kushner reports that, by broadening the scope of the Fair Housing Act in
1988 to forbid discrimination based on sex or familial status, Congress provoked a flood of
non-race-based housing claims that now swamp the HUD resources previously available for
the investigation of claims of racial discrimination. Kushner, supra note 37, at 565-66.
42. Gary Orfield, The Movement for Housing Integration, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION
AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 24, at 18, 24-25. Most lower federal courts have permitted
recovery under the Fair Housing Act without proof that a defendant acted with discriminatory
intent or motive, so long as a plaintiff has demonstrated that a defendant's actions have had a
discriminatory impact or effect. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 844 F.2d 926, 934-37 (2d Cir.), review declined in part and judgment aff'd, 488 U.S. 15
(1988) (per curiam); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986-88 (4th Cir. 1984). The
Seventh Circuit has established a four-factor test for Title VIII liability; while proof of discrim-
inatory intent is one of those factors, it is the "least important," and not all four are necessary
to establish a Title VIII violation. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-92 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). But see
Brown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1115-16 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that some
allegation of discriminatory intent is necessary to prevail against private defendants, although
proof of discriminatory impact or effect will suffice in actions against governmental
defendants).
43. Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. &
PoL'Y REV. 375, 379-80 (1988). Discrimination can occur at any of multiple stages in the
process that leads to a real estate purchase or lease. See Turner, supra note 9, at 189-91 (detail-
ing the steps at which housing discrimination may occur). It is especially difficult to detect
methods of housing discrimination that involve the withholding of information about the full
range of housing options. Darden, supra note 17, at 8.
44. GALSTER, supra note 29, at 17-18.
45. See, e.g., Kushner, supra note 37, at 585-86; John Yinger, The Racial Dimension of
Urban Housing Markets in the 1980s, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 16, at 43, 63-
64. For an interesting account of the possibilities, and the inevitable limitations, of a vigorous
federal enforcement campaign, see Joel L. Selig, The Justice Department and Racially Exclu-
sionary Municipal Practices: Creative Ventures in Fair Housing Act Enforcement, 17 U.C. DA-
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ance to the nationwide network of private fair housing organizations."
Still, none of these steps, even viewed collectively, seems likely to detect
or deter the more than two million estimated acts of housing discrimina-
tion committed every year. They seem even less likely to counter the
powerful economic incentives that prompt this illegal behavior.47
B. The Efficacy of Systemic Approaches
Widespread violations of civil rights laws are nothing new, and ex-
perience has shown that effective compliance strategies cannot rely upon
the punishment of individual acts of misconduct. Instead they require
the design of affirmative, system-wide remedies.48 The fifty-year battle in
the South to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment against the disen-
franchisement of black citizens offers a useful example.49 Each legal step
forward in the campaign to assure African Americans the vote was met
by official and private resistance no less determined than that which to-
day confronts the proponents of residential desegregation-a veritable
dance of sallies, side-steps, and false assurance with very little measurable
vis L. REv. 445, 475-504 (1984) (describing a special two-year initiative to enforce the Fair
Housing Act undertaken by the United States Department of Justice during the latter years of
the Carter Administration).
46. Roderic V.O. Boggs et al., Use of Testing in Civil Rights Enforcement, in CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 317, 340
(Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1992) (urging the establishment and funding of a
national center to provide training and coordination on audit methods); Downs, Policy Direc-
tions, supra note 26, at 739-40 (same).
47. George Gaister, pointing to some successes reported in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, and
in Kentucky, has argued from the limited evidence available that aggressive use of audit meth-
ods "can create a potent deterrent." GALSTER, supra note 29, at 18.
Yet a supply-side housing discrimination strategy founded upon interdiction and deter-
rence-largely directed against the "suppliers" of the illegal product-may have little greater
success than the similar policy approach adopted in the nation's campaign against the sale of
illegal drugs. In that arena, neither a sharp increase in criminal penalties levied against con-
victed suppliers of drugs nor an increased financial commitment to federal and state drug law
enforcement has proved successful. Many authorities now concede that, unless consumer de-
mand for the illegal product is reduced, the success of an interdiction effort is unlikely. John J.
DiIulio, Jr., Crime, in SETTING DOMESTIC PRIORITIES: WHAT CAN GOVERNMENT Do? 101,
125-27 (Henry J. Aaron & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1992) (noting that major, costly law en-
forcement efforts to identify and incarcerate drug dealers in New York and Florida have done
almost nothing to diminish drug traffic).
While this Essay concurs in the call for expanded use of fair housing audit methods and
for more aggressive federal and state action against housing discrimination, it nonetheless ar-
gues that a "demand-side deterrent" like that proposed in the remainder of this Essay has
greater potential to achieve the goals of the fair housing laws.
48. William L. Taylor makes this argument effectively in his article, William Taylor,
Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1717-25 (1986).
49. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, & AMERICAN LAW §§ 4.4-4.7, at 190-212 (3d
ed. 1992) (chronicling the campaign for enfranchisement).
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progress toward genuine enfranchisement.5 ° Only when Congress passed
the Voting Rights Act of 196551 did blacks begin to register to vote in
great numbers.5 2
The structure of this extremely successful act merits consideration.
The Voting Rights Act self-consciously abandoned a case-by-case search
for identifiable misconduct in favor of a wholesale suspension of state
voting "tests or devices," such as literacy tests, character tests, etc.,53 in
every jurisdiction where noncompliance was deemed likely.54 In those
50. The Supreme Court emphasized the ineffectiveness of earlier, moderate legislative
remedies in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), which upheld the more radi-
cal legislative solution embodied in the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
In recent years, Congress has repeatedly tried to cope with the problem [of vot-
ing discrimination] by facilitating case-by-case litigation ....
Despite the earnest efforts of the Justice Department and of many federal
judges, these new laws have done little to cure the problem ....
The previous legislation has proved ineffective for a number of reasons. Voting
suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 man-
hours spent.., in preparation for trial. ... . Even when favorable decisions have
finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to discrimina-
tory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests
designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro registration.
Id. at 313-14; see, eg., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151-56 (1965) (enjoining
Louisiana's use of a subjective "interpretation" test for voting which had allowed local regis-
trars to deny the ballot to black applicants deemed unable to interpret state or federal constitu-
tional provisions adequately); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1965)
(reviewing a 75-year legal campaign by Mississippi officials to deny African Americans the
franchise); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (striking the exclusion of blacks from
membership in a Texas "pre-primary, Jaybird Democratic Association," whose nominees reg-
ularly won all Democratic Party nominations); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939)
(striking Oklahoma law granting "non-grandfathered" voters only 12 days to register to vote
or be perpetually disenfranchised); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932) (striking Texas
law that allowed Democratic State Executive Committee to prohibit blacks from participating
in Democratic Party primary elections); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927)
(striking Texas law barring African Americans from participating in Democratic Party pri-
mary election); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 361-68 (1915) (striking a "grandfather"
clause in Oklahoma's constitution, which nominally imposed a literacy requirement on all
Oklahoma voters while exempting those (the white majority) whose ancestors had been enti-
tled to vote on January 1, 1866).
51. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-
1973b(b) (1988)).
52. See Cynthia Wright, Comment, The Effects of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act on Minority Voting Practices, 28 How. L.J. 589, 592 (1985) (noting that over one million
blacks registered to vote between 1965 and 1972); id. at 600 (reporting that black voter regis-
tration doubled between 1960 and 1980 in eleven Southern states, with almost two million
blacks added to registration rolls by 1975).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1988).
54. The Act was designed to apply to every district that used a "voting test or device"
where fewer than 50% of eligible voters had registered to vote in that district as of November
1, 1964, or where fewer than 50% of those registered had actually voted in the 1964 presiden-
tial election. Id. Together, these criteria targeted the Southern states and a few random juris-
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jurisdictions, without further proof of fault, the Act delegated to the fed-
eral Department of Justice broad remedial powers to appoint federal vot-
ing registrars who would supplement (if not replace) local registrars.5"
The Act made illegal not only voting devices that had been enacted "for
the purpose" of abridging the voting rights of racial minorities, but also
all devices that, in practice, had such an impact or effect.5 6 Finally, the
Act authorized the Department of Justice to "preclear" every proposed
change in local voting procedures in the affected jurisdictions to intercept
and forestall any changes that would violate the ends of the Act. 7
A similar congressionally initiated change of strategy proved neces-
sary to end school segregation in the face of determined Southern resist-
ance. The Supreme Court's unanimous decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education5 declared that de jure public school segregation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and ordered desegregation "with all deliberate
speed."5 9 Yet the Court's mandate yielded little actual desegregation
during the decade that followed, despite hundreds of lawsuits brought to
compel compliance.60 The breakthrough came only with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,61 which finally bestowed authority on the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to issue administrative guidelines
demanding measurable desegregation.62 The subsequent HEW regula-
tions required every formerly dejure school district that hoped to receive
dictions in other parts of the country. See H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2444-45.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(d), (e) (1988). The Act does grant a narrow "escape clause" to a
state or jurisdiction able to demonstrate that incidents of racial discrimination in the applica-
tion of its tests or device are "few in number and have been promptly and effectively cor-
rected," if it can also prove that "the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated"
with "no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future." Id. § 1973a(a).
56. Id. § 1973a(b).
57. Id. § 1973c.
58. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
59. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
60. By 1964, a decade after Brown, only 2% of all black children in the South were at-
tending desegregated public schools. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY:
BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 75 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989);
see United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 853-56, 860-61 (5th Cir.
1966) (summarizing judicial efforts), modified per curium en banc, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
61. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 401, 601-02, 78 Stat. 246, 252-53 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c & 200d-1(1988)).
62. Congress declared in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that "[n]o person...
may be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988). Congress empowered the Department of Education, among other federal departments,
to issue rules and regulations to enforce the prohibitions of § 2000d. Id. § 2000d-l.
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federal aid to education either to submit an effective desegregation plan
for certification by HEW or to demonstrate that it was operating under a
valid judicial decree requiring school desegregation.63
To provide an economic incentive for compliance, Congress soon
enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 4 which
appropriated very substantial educational grants to states that chose to
comply with federal civil rights statutes.6 5 By delegating to HEW the
authority both to prescribe Title VI regulations and to withhold appro-
priations from school boards whose plans were judged inadequate, Con-
gress created extremely powerful tools to demand meaningful public
school desegregation throughout the South. Once these remedial tools
had been forged, progress toward desegregation was remarkable."
Likewise, widespread racial desegregation in private employment
came only after Congress empowered an administrative agency, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to investigate
63. 34 C.F.R. § 100.1-100.13 (1992). The HEW regulations included detailed guidelines
spelling out the administrative steps necessary to bring a school district into compliance with
Title VI. Id. § 100.4(a)-(c). See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 433-34 n.2 (1968)
(describing the promulgation of HEW guidelines).
Subsequently, Judge John Minor Wisdom announced that the Fifth Circuit would aban-
don case-by-case adjudication of school desegregation plans in favor of a sweeping decree ap-
plicable to school districts throughout the circuit that drew heavily upon HEW desegregation
guidelines. Jefferson County, 372 F.2d at 847-48, 886-96.
Judge Wisdom reviewed the history of widespread delay in implementing the mandate of
Brown, and emphasized the congressional intent (evident in the Civil Rights Act of 1964) to
speed the implementation process. He then announced that federal courts should henceforth
focus upon demonstrable results, not upon evidence that school boards were acting in good
faith: "The only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is one that
works." IcL at 847.
The following year the Supreme Court adopted a similar approach, imposing on each
southern school board the responsibility not merely to demonstrate that its desegregation plan
had been drawn in good faith, but to establish "that its proposed plan promises meaningful and
immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation." Green, 391 U.S. at
439. The Supreme Court held that the desegregation plan at issue in Green, which afforded
students throughout the school district complete freedom of choice in the selection of a public
school, was constitutionally "unacceptable" because it had not yielded meaningful desegrega-
tion throughout the system. Id. at 440-41.
64. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 70 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-246 (1988)).
65. The Senate Report that accompanied the Act indicated an intention to provide $1.06
billion to local school districts for educational assistance to disadvantaged children. S. REp.
No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450-51.
66. See GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1968-1980, at 5 (1983) (reporting that the percentage of southern black children in all-black
schools dropped from 98% in 1963 to 25% in 1968 as a result of enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by HEW and the federal courts); id. at 4, tbl. 2 (reporting that the percent-
age of black children in "predominantly minority" schools in the South declined from 80.9%
in 1968 to 57.1% in 1980).
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and remedy charges of unlawful employment discrimination67 and to is-
sue regulations to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65
The EEOC 69 and ultimately the Supreme Court70 then interpreted Title
VII to prohibit not only individual acts of discrimination,71 but also the
use of employment criteria that led to underrepresentation of blacks in
an employer's work force, unless those criteria could be shown to be re-
quired as a matter of business necessity.72 Moreover, both the EEOC73
and, ultimately, the Supreme Court,74 read Title VII's remedial powers
broadly to approve affirmative, race-conscious hiring and/or promo-
tional goals and timetables which prescribe a specific number of minority
workers to be hired or promoted within a fixed time as a remedy for past
discrimination. 75 The effect of Title VII on the composition of the Amer-
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988).
68. Id. §§ 2000e-4 to -12.
69. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3, 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (Aug. 1, 1970) ("The use of any selection
procedure which has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion, or other employment or
membership opportunities of members of any race... will be considered to be discriminatory
... unless the procedure has been validated in accordance with these guidelines.").
70. See, eg., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
71. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-06 (1973) (prescribing
burdens of production and proof in "disparate treatment" cases).
72. In Griggs, a "disparate impact" case, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to in-
validate the Duke Power Company's use of intelligence tests or a high school graduation re-
quirement as employment criteria. Both policies had a sharply adverse impact on potential
black employees and were held improper, absent proof by the employer that "the high school
completion requirement ... [or] the general intelligence test ... bear[s] a demonstrable rela-
tionship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
The Court reasoned: "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
73. See EEOC's Guidelines on Affirmative Action, 44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979) (codified at
29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.1-12 (1992)).
74. In Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986),
the Court held that a district court, as a remedy for violations of Title VII, may order an
employer to engage in preferential hiring or promotion of African Americans who were not
themselves the identifiable victims of the employers' previous acts of discrimination. Id. at
482-83.
75. Affirmative action plans have generated intense scholarly and judicial controversy,
because they place in conflict two important goals: The remediation of prior acts of discrimi-
nation that have denied equal employment opportunities to African Americans, and the consti-
tutional desire to treat all persons without regard to their race. A deeply divided majority of
the Court suggested in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), that an
employer could not justify the lay-off of more senior, non-minority teachers while retaining
less senior, minority teachers, solely to overcome prior societal discrimination against minori-
ties absent a court determination that the defendant employer had engaged in specific acts of
discrimination against identifiable victims. Id. at 274-76.
The Supreme Court nonetheless has recognized broad power in Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact race-conscious federal legislation to overcome the effects of
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ican work force has been significant.76
The cumulative lesson of the voting, public education, and employ-
ment statutes is that serious civil rights remedies should: (1) rely upon
objective, system-wide goals; (2) demand concrete progress toward those
goals from the chief institutional actors who implement them; and (3)
offer powerful financial incentives, both positive and negative, to promote
compliance.
C. Lessons From the "'Fair Share" Approach
No federal housing statute has ever had notable success in combat-
ting residential segregation, because none, certainly neither the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 nor the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, was ever designed to demand system-wide results. One such
housing strategy has emerged in the states, however:77 the "fair share"
statutes associated most prominently with New Jersey's Mount Laurel
decisions78 and its 1985 Fair Housing Act.79
The New Jersey approach was prompted by a decade-long litigation
effort, originally filed on behalf of poor and minority citizens, to chal-
lenge the exclusionary zoning laws of Mount Laurel, New Jersey, a sub-
urban municipality with zoning laws that effectively barred construction
of low-income, multi-family housing. 0 Although the lawsuit alleged
past societal discrimination against African Americans. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 483-87 (1980); cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486-91 (1989)
(invalidating a municipal minority business set-aside program because it was not justified by
clear evidence of past discrimination by the city that would warrant "race-based relief").
76. Taylor, supra note 48, at 1712-13 (noting several studies that have documented the
positive effects of Title VII on minority employment opportunities).
77. See generally DAVID LISTOKIN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION (1976) (discuss-
ing fair share housing objectives, strategies, and examples).
78. South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (1975) (Mount Laurel 1), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975);
South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390
(1983) (Mount Laurel I1). Some commentators have described Hills Development Co. v.
Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 21, 510 A.2d 621, 634 (1986), in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985 as
"Mount Laurel III." See, e.g., Harold McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclu-
sionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 623 (1987). As John M. Payne ex-
plained in another context: "'Mount Laurel' is both an idea and a case. The idea is... that
land development is a quasi-public utility and should be regulated in the public interest." John
M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies, 16
REAL EST. L.J. 20, 44 (1987).
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
80. See generally AFTER MOUNT LAUREL, supra note 32 (containing a series of essays
discussing Mount Laurel); Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The
Legacy of the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186 (1991); Daniel E. Chall, Housing
Reform in New Jersey: The Mount Laurel Decision, 10 FED. RESERVE BK. OF N.Y. Q. REV.
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that Mount Laurel's zoning laws were racially motivated,81 the New
Jersey Supreme Court ultimately declined to resolve that issue,82 instead
adopting a different doctrinal approach. The court held that New
Jersey's state zoning enabling laws, which empower its local municipali-
ties to promulgate zoning ordinances,8 3 were subject to New Jersey's gen-
eral constitutional imperative to legislate only "for the general welfare."
Any zoning ordinance that denied reasonable housing opportunities to a
"fair share" of a region's low- and moderate-income citizens, the Court
reasoned, contravened both the enabling statute and New Jersey's consti-
tutional requirements. 84
19 (1985-86); Mark A. Hughes & Peter M. VanDoren, Social Policy through Land Reform:
New Jersey's Mount Laurel Controversy, 105 POL. Sci. Q. 97 (1990); James A. Kushner, Land
Use Litigation and Low Income Housing: Mandating Regional Fair Share Plans, 9 CLEARING-
HOUSE 10 (1975); Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel At Work Affordable Housing in New
Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197 (1989); Harold A. McDougall, Mount Laurel II
And The Revitalizing City, 15 RUTGERS L. J. 667 (1984) [hereinafter McDougall, Revitalizing
City]; McDougall, supra note 78; Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements
Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 665 (1987) [hereinafter McDougall,
Regional Contribution]; John M. Payne, From the Courts, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 75 (1991) [herein-
after Payne, From the Courts]; Payne, supra note 78; John M. Payne, Housing Rights and
Remedies: A "Legislative" History of Mount Laurel II, 14 SETON HALL L. Rv. 889 (1984);
Jerome G. Rose, New Jersey Enacts a Fair Housing Law, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 195 (1985); Nor-
man Williams, Jr., The Background and Significance of Mount Laurel II, 26 J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 3 (1984); Michael A. Stegman, A Review of Production under New Jersey's Mount
Laurel Inclusionary Housing Process: A Comparison of States and Localities (Robert W. Bur-
chell ed., Oct. 1, 1990) (unpublished draft in Affordable Housing Paper Series, available from
New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing).
81. See John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount Laurel: Is Affordable Housing Fair Hous-
ing?, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y RFv. 361-62 (1988); Williams, supra note 80, at 8.
82. "[Wie accept the representation of the municipality's counsel at oral argument that
the regulatory scheme was not adopted with any desire or intent to exclude prospective resi-
dents on the obviously illegal basis of race, origin or believed social incompatibility." Mount
Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
83. Act of April 3, 1928, ch. 274, 1928 N.J. Laws 696 (zoning enabling statute) (repealed
by Act of Jan. 14, 1976, ch. 291, 1976 N.J. Laws 1107).
84. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned:
[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of
the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is
restricted in the same manner as is the state. So, when regulation does have a sub-
stantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.
Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories
of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare re-
quired in all local land use regulation. Further, the universal and constant need for
such housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general wel-
fare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends be-
yond their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the
particular municipality. It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive ob-
ligation arises for each such municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its
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Mount Laurel radically reinterpreted traditional zoning concepts 5
by conditioning the legality of municipal zoning ordinances upon their
consideration of regional and statewide housing needs.86 Indeed, many
perceived Mount Laurel as a decision that would allow New Jersey's ur-
ban poor some meaningful access to the state's growing suburban areas.8 7
Predictably, the decision provoked widespread criticism and substantial
resistance.8" Furthermore, because the decision was content to announce
a new right without specifying effective, complementary remedies-in-
deed, without even offering clarity on its key terms89-it became the ob-
land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and
choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within
its boundaries.
Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
85. See Kushner, supra note 80, at 10 ("The carefully reasoned and innovative opinion
may ... prove to be the Magna Carta of suburban low and moderate income housing opportu-
nity."); Williams, supra note 80, at 8 ("Mount Laurel I ... [is] [c]learly the most important
zoning opinion since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)").
86. Professor Harold McDougall has summarized the change in concept:
In Mount Laurel I, each municipality had pursued a zoning course that effectively
screened out the nuisance costs, congestion costs, and fiscal costs of regional develop-
ment, as well as the presence of persons antithetical to the social and educational
milieu of the incumbent residents. Although the municipalities were not purpose-
fully acting in concert to exclude low and moderate income people, their collective
conduct had that result....
The Mount Laurel I court addressed the problem by shifting power over the
locational choices of low and moderate income people from the municipal to the state
level. The court determined that statutory provisions requiring the protection of "re-
gional general welfare" obligated each developing municipality to provide its fair
share of low and moderate income housing. In particular, the Court held that the
Standard Zoning Enabling Act imposed an obligation on municipalities to zone for
the welfare of all the state's people, not merely for local residents.
McDougall, Regional Contribution, supra note 80, at 672-73.
87. See, eg., Jerome G. Rose, Is There a Fair Share Housing Allocation Plan That Is
Acceptable to Suburban Municipalities?, in AFrER MOUNT LAUREL, supra note 32, at 114, 116
(observing that "it should be clear that the purpose of a fair share housing allocation plan is to
provide an opportunity for low and moderate-income families to escape from the older central
cities to the newer developing suburbs"); Kushner, supra note 80, at 12 (noting that "Mount
Laurel adds new life to the hope that land use litigation may successfully break down metro-
politan racial and economic segregation").
88. See, e.g., McDougall, Revitalizing City, supra note 80, at 667 (describing the "blister-
ing academic criticism, municipal intransigence and legislative inaction" that followed Mount
Laurel 1); see also Payne, supra note 78, at 22 ("It is difficult to convey adequately the intensity
of the public reaction to the Mount Laurel process since 1983. Where Mount Laurel I could be
ignored because it was ineffective, Mount LaurelI worked and it stirred up a firestorm."). In
addition to criticism directed against the wisdom of its policies, the New Jersey Supreme Court
also was condemned strongly for intruding into what many contended was the legislative
sphere. See, eg., Berger, supra note 80, at 186-200; Jerome G. Rose, Waning Judicial Legiti-
macy: The Price of Judicial Promulgation of Urban Policy, 20 URn. LAW. 801, 818-39 (1988).
89. See, e.g., Jerome G. Rose, Is the Decision Based on Wishful Thinking?, in AFtER
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ject of complicated, lengthy litigation that delayed actual implementation
for a decade.90 Only after further judicial elaboration in 1983,91 and then
after the New Jersey legislature's passage of a statutory scheme in 1985
to provide administrative enforcement 92 did the full contours of New
Jersey's "fair share" doctrine take shape.
As presently interpreted, the New Jersey approach requires munici-
palities to do more than eliminate exclusionary zoning laws that deny
housing opportunities to a region's low- and moderate-income popula-
tion.93 The state requires city-by-city efforts to meet each region's docu-
MouNT LAUREL, supra note 32, 183, at 184-85 (noting that there are at least four basic alter-
native ways to measure "fair share"); Norman Williams, Jr., On from Mount Laurel: Guide-
lines on the "Regional General Welfare," in AFTER MouNT LAUREL, supra note 32, at 79, 85-
96 (discussing unresolved issues raised by Mount Laurel 1).
As the New Jersey Supreme Court itself acknowledged in Mount Laurel II
Although the Court [in Mount Laurel 1] set forth important guidelines for imple-
menting the doctrine, their application to particular cases was complex, and the reso-
lution of many questions left uncertain. Was it a "developing" municipality? What
was the "region," and how was it to be determined? How was the "fair share" to be
calculated within that region? Precisely what must that municipality do to "affirma-
tively afford" an opportunity for the construction of lower income housing? Other
questions were similarly troublesome.
South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 11), 92 N.J.
158, 205, 456 A.2d 390, 413 (1983).
90. As Professor McDougall observed:
The Mount Laurel I decision was a pathbreaking departure from previous ap-
proaches. Nonetheless, it could only tentatively sketch practical remedies for the
rights it established. Consequently, the suburbs did not change their behavior and
built little low and moderate income housing after the decision. Moreover, the un-
certainty of standards for municipal compliance emboldened the suburbs to tie mat-
ters up in court with extensive argument over details.
McDougall, Regional Contribution, supra note 80, at 676; see also Chall, supra note 80, at 19
n.2 (noting that as of June 1985, over 135 Mount Laurel cases were in various stages of
litigation).
91. The New Jersey Supreme Court made it clear in Mount Laurel II that municipalities
were obligated to do more than remove exclusionary zoning statutes that denied low- and
moderate-income housing opportunities; municipalities had affirmative obligations to bring
about meaningful access to their communities. Mount Laurel I1, 92 N.J. at 214-217, 258-78,
456 A.2d at 418-419, 442-452. The court also held that the obligation applied not only to
"developing communities" that were undergoing rapid expansion, but to all communities, even
older, more stable, "developed" communities, so long as they were designated as "growth
areas" in New Jersey's State Development Guide Plan. Id. at 214-215, 456 A.2d at 418. Fi-
nally, the Court explicitly authorized "builders remedies," under which developers could sue
noncompliant municipalities to obtain density bonuses that would permit them to build more
housing units than a municipality's zoning ordinance would otherwise parmit, so long as they
agreed to designate a percentage of the units for low- or moderate-income sale. Id. at 218, 279-
81, 456 A.2d at 420, 452-453; see supra note 78.
92. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-300 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
93. Daniel Chall has underlined this new obligation:
[Mount Laurel I1] calls for affirmative measures when simply removing restrictions
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mented low- and moderate-income housing need. Under New Jersey's
1985 statute, a statewide administrative body, the Council on Affordable
Housing (COA-), 94 divides the state into housing regions using regional
planning criteria,9" and then calculates the present and foreseeable hous-
ing need in each region.96 It then allocates a "fair share" of low- and
moderate-income housing to each municipality within the region.97 Mu-
nicipalities subsequently are invited to submit specific "fair share" plans
to explain how they intend to supply their designated housing need. 98
Until the Council has certified a municipality's fair share plan, the mu-
nicipality remains open to so-called "builders remedies"-lawsuits, first
recognized in Mount Laurel II, that permit private developers to demand
that local zoning boards open municipal sites to low- or moderate-in-
come development.99
on multi-unit structures would result in the construction of only high-priced middle-
income housing ....
Nowhere does the opinion suggest that these social goals approximate the out-
comes that would have prevailed in the absence of past exclusion. The Court's rul-
ings instead seem to aim for specific land-use allocations that might never have
otherwise occurred, even in a non-exclusionary housing market.
Chall, supra note 80, at 24-25. Professors Hughes and VanDoren have described the new
obligation in even more dramatic terms:
The court not only ruled that there are severe limits on the right of suburban com-
munities to restrict the entry of lower-income households but also set in motion the
most fundamental redistribution of property rights ever attempted by a state govern-
ment in the United States. The court insisted that the state's municipalities have an
affirmative obligation to redistribute low- and moderate-income households more
evenly across the state.
Hughes & VanDoren, supra note 80, at 97.
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-305 (West 1986).
95. Id. § 52:27D-307.a, .e.
96. Id. § 52:27D-307.b.
97. Id. § 52:27D-307.c. The statute instructs COAH to credit each municipality "on a
one-to-one basis [for] each current unit of low and moderate income housing of adequate stan-
dard," id. § 52:27D-307.c(1), and to take into account such factors as "available vacant and
developable land, infrastructure considerations or environmental or historic preservation fac-
tors." Id. § 52:27D-307.c(2).
98. Id. § 52:27D-309 & -310.
99. South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 11),
92 N.J. 158, 267-74, 456 A.2d 390, 446-50 (1983). According to New Jersey commentators, it
was largely the desire for a "safe harbor" from "builders remedies" that prompted many mu-
nicipalities to support the adoption of the 1985 Act. See Rose, supra note 80, at 209-10.
COAH has authority to certify a municipal "fair share" plan. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-
313 (West Supp. 1992). Certification by COAH entitles the municipality to a six-year period
of repose, allowing it to transfer any builder's lawsuit during this period to COAH; certifica-
tion also provides a strong, statutorily-created "presumption of validity" to a municipality's
housing plan. Id. § 52:27D-317 (West 1986). See generally McDougall, Regional Contribution,
supra note 80, 680-81; McDougall, supra note 78, at 635-37.
[The Council] occupies a curious position in the politics of affordable housing in New
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As noted, Mount Laurel and the 1985 statute stop somewhere short
of requiring municipalities to use their own funds to build needed low-
income housing."° Instead, the statute contemplates that many munici-
palities will rely upon "density bonuses," mandatory "set-asides," or
other zoning devices to induce private developers to include low- and
moderate-income units among their market-level homes in housing de-
velopments.101 To date, New Jersey's fair share approach has generated
a substantial flow of new low- and moderate-income housing.10 2
The New Jersey approach has parallels in the statutes of a number
of other states and localities, including California, 03 Connecticut,'1 4
Jersey because it has no power to command action by the municipalities that appear
before it. Municipalities do so voluntarily, and the COAH's only "sanction" is its
power to deny substantive certification of the municipality's housing plan, which, in
turn (and in theory), leaves the municipality vulnerable to a Mount Laurel suit in
superior court.
Payne, From The Courts, supra note 80, at 80.
100. Professor Jerome Rose describes the requirements of the Act as follows:
The [1985] legislation reduces, but does not eliminate, the ambiguity of the extent of
the municipal obligation to help finance affordable housing. The legislation declares
in several places that the obligation imposed... relates to regulation of land use with
the implication that it does not include funding. However, in the preparation of a
municipal housing element, the Act requires every municipality to "consider" several
techniques that involve municipal expenditures.
Rose, supra note 80, at 207; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311.a (West 1986) (detailing the
technique to be considered).
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:26D-312.a (West 1986). In a controversial modification of the
original judicial approach, the 1985 statute also has allowed any municipality to "transfer" up
to 50% of its fair share obligation to a "receiving jurisdiction" (usually a central city), by
offering to pay for the construction of Mount Laurel units in the receiving jurisdiction. Id.
§§ 52:27D-311.c, -312.
This provision has stirred theoretical debate. See generally McDougall, Regional Contri-
bution, supra note 80, at 681-95 (contending that New Jersey cities' weak financial position
makes them unable to bargain with suburban "sending" municipalities for payments that will
cover the full municipal costs of the transferred housing and that will protect the housing
needs of urban dwellers); Hughes & VanDoren, supra note 80, at 108-10 (urging that each
region include not only a receiving municipality but several potential sending municipalities, so
that receiving municipalities can bargain for the best deal). The provision, however, appears to
have had little practical impact; according to one recent survey, only 813 regional contribution
units were identified among the 23,516 on which the surveyors had information. Lamar et al.,
supra note 80, at 1210 tbl. I. Professor Stegman, quoting the executive director of COAH,
suggests that just over 1000 units-fewer than 10% of the 11,451 completed units in his sur-
vey-were the product of regional agreement units. Stegman, supra note 80, at 24.
102. Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1209 (noting that 54 municipalities surveyed in 1988
reported that 2803 affordable units had been completed, that 11,133 more were pending or
under construction, and that 8740 were proposed by 1993, for a total of 22,703 units); id. at
1258 ("This is far and away the principal source of affordable housing being constructed for
lower-income households in New Jersey."); see also Stegman, supra note 80, at 24-25 (report-
ing that a total of 32,000 fair share units have been completed or are under construction-ten
times the recent production rate for federally-assisted housing in New Jersey).
103. By law, every community in California is required to adopt a long-term development
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Massachusetts, 10 and Oregon. 116 Only a few of these statutes and ordi-
plan that includes a housing element. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65580 to 65589.8 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1993). The housing element must include a five-year projection of housing needs with a
plan on how to meet those needs. Id. § 65583(c) (West Supp. 1993). Regional councils must
allocate to localities the fair share of regional housing need based upon state-approved projec-
tions. Id. § 65584(a). Under a 1984 amendment, the California legislature required that each
regional fair share plan must receive approval from the California Department of Housing and
Community Development. Id.; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Exclusionary Zoning and Pur-
poseful Segregation in Housing: Two Wrongs Deserving Separate Remedies, 18 URn. LAW. 393,
410-11 (1986) (describing California's statutory approach to combatting exclusionary zoning).
In addition, each city or county must grant mandatory density bonuses of 25% or provide
other incentives, in exchange for requirements that private developers include 10% low-in-
come units, or 25% moderate-income units, or 50% elderly units, in every housing develop-
ment that exceeds five units. In the alternative, the developers may be required to make an in-
lieu contribution to a fund for the construction of low-income housing. The definitions of
"low-income" and "moderate-income" under the California law are very broad; "low-income"
applicants include all those with incomes below 80% of the county median income, and "mod-
erate-income" applicants are those with incomes between 80% and 120% of the county me-
dian income.
Very recently, the legislature revised the statute to grant more generous incentives to
developers and to tighten the targeting of the statutory categories, adding a very-low-income
category.
The California legislature, however, has not given enforcement authority to any adminis-
trative agency; instead, it has committed enforcement to the judiciary in lawsuits brought by
aggrieved applicants. This has proven to be a weak and ineffective means by which to achieve
compliance. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of'Inclusionary' Zoning, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1167 (1981); Stegman, supra note 80, at 5-9, 19.
104. A recent Connecticut statute creates an expedited, direct appeal to a specially desig-
nated state superior court whenever a local zoning commission or municipal planning author-
ity denies an "affordable housing development plan"--defined to include both governmentally-
assisted housing plans and private developments in which at least 20% of the units will be
reserved for persons with incomes below 80% of area medians. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
30g(a) (West Supp. 1992). The statute creates a safe harbor from developer litigation for any
Connecticut municipality in which 10% of all dwelling units are assisted housing or affordable
housing, id. § 8-30g(f), or in which an affordable housing project has been certified by the
Department of Housing within the previous year. Id. § 8-30g(g). See Stegman, supra note 80,
at 14-15.
Connecticut also recently adopted legislation requiring its local zoning commissions to
include, within their required local development plans, some "provision for the development of
housing opportunities ... for all residents of the municipality and the planning region,...
[which] shall also promote housing choice and economic diversity in housing, including hous-
ing for both low and moderate income households .. " CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-23(A)
(West Supp. 1992). Coordinate legislation requires Connecticut's Commissioner of Housing
and the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority to supervise these plans, make annual reports
to the Connecticut legislature, id. §§ 8-37aa, -37bb, and administer the program to promote
"fair housing choice and racial and economic integration." Id. § 8-37cc.
105. Massachusetts enacted an "anti-snob" law in 1969, which permits a quick appeal from
any zoning decision by a town that denies a developer's plan to build low- or moderate-income
housing. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). The statute
defines affordable housing as "any housing subsidized by the federal or state government." Id.
§ 20; see Stegman, supra note 80, at 12. The law provides for a one-stop local approval from
the local Zoning Board of Appeals for all needed development permits, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (West 1983), and then permits an appeal of any unfavorable decision to a
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nances, however, require a statewide assessment of need; instead, most
create inflexible requirements that developers include a fixed percentage
of low-income units in any new developments, as in California, or allow
developers in communities with disproportionately small percentages of
low-income housing units a superior channel to demand rezoning, as in
Massachusetts.
Despite its virtues, the New Jersey approach has five crucial defi-
ciencies in design and in implementation that render it insufficient as a
federal remedy for residential racial segregation. 1 7 First, by omitting ex-
press racial goals and by failing to monitor low-income participants to
ensure racial diversity, it allows suburban municipalities to create hous-
special State Housing Appeals Committee. Id § 22. The Committee is required to overturn a
town's adverse zoning decision if a developer's plan proves to be "consistent with local needs"
for subsidized housing. Id. § 23. A town will be deemed conclusively to have met its low- and
moderate-income need only if (1) more than 10% of its total housing units are low-and moder-
ate-income, (2) more than 1.5% of the total land area zoned for residential, commercial, or
industrial use in the town is comprised of such units, and (3) the developer's proposed project
would occupy more than 0.3% of all town land, or would occupy 10 or more acres (whichever
is larger in any calendar year). Id. § 20. See McDougall, supra note 78, at 645-47. Between
1969 and 1988, a very high percentage of all such applications have been approved either
locally or on appeal to the Housing Appeals Board. See Stegman, supra note 80, at 11 (report-
ing that among the 33,684 units sought to be built during this time, approximately 20,000 were
in advanced planning, under construction, or completed).
In addition to these legal remedies, Massachusetts Executive Order No. 215 recites that
state and federal development grants will be denied to any municipality that persists in the
enforcement of exclusionary zoning ordinances. Mass. Exec. Order No. 215 (1982). Although
the Massachusetts Executive Office of Community Development is charged with implementing
this order, commentators suggest that it has not acted with sufficient vigor. See, eg., McDou-
gall, supra note 78, at 648 ("Executive Order No. 215 is a strong and necessary weapon... but
it must be more aggressively enforced.").
Despite these tools, moreover, most affordable housing in Massachusetts continues to be
built in urban centers, not suburbs or rural areas. According to Professor Stegman, "just 1.4
percent of all family housing in Massachusetts suburbs is classified as affordable, while 95 cities
and towns ... contain no affordable housing at all." Stegman, supra note 80, at 11-12.
Recently, Massachusetts has encouraged localities to take more affirmative steps; in a
move somewhat reminiscent of New Jersey's current approach, the state has promised munici-
palities that certification of their Housing Development Action Plans-which must include an
assessment of housing needs, concrete plans to meet those needs, and some objective measures
of success-will bring a three-year presumption of validity to subsequent town decisions on
developers' permit requests. Id. at 13-14.
106. Oregon has a state-level administrative apparatus, including a Department of Land
Conservation and Development and a Land Conservation and Development Commission
(LCDC), that regulates all land-use control by localities, not merely low-income housing uses.
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005 -.850 (1989). The LCDC can mandate local compliance with its
statewide goals by administrative order. Id. § 197.320. See McDougall, supra note 78, at 649.
107. See generally Payne, supra note 78, 30-32 (noting that COAH has defined New
Jersey's housing regions in ways that "wall off" those areas with the greatest housing need
from those areas with the greatest source of supply, and that COAH has grossly underesti-
mated actual housing need).
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ing subject only to the weak anti-discrimination requirements of the fed-
eral and state fair housing laws. Not surprisingly, recent surveys reveal
that virtually all of the low- and moderate-income housing units built
under New Jersey's fair share program have been filled by white
applicants.10 8
Second, the statute effectively permits municipalities to meet their
fair share obligations by serving only the most well-off among eligible
applicants. This is true for several reasons. The New Jersey approach
links eligibility for Mount Laurel housing to the state's median income;
an applicant can qualify for a "moderate income" unit with an annual
income that is eighty percent of the statewide median, and for a "low
income" unit with an annual income that is fifty percent of the statewide
median. 09 Because New Jersey has a relatively high median income
(roughly $38,000 in 1990) Mount Laurel units are available to applicants
with incomes of $19,000 to $30,400.110 While persons at these income
levels undoubtedly experience difficulty in purchasing or renting housing
in markets as tight as those of the 1980s, they are not the urban poor
whose housing plight prompted the Kerner Commission Report or the
initial Mount Laurel opinion."'
Moreover, by tying Mount Laurel eligibility to current income, the
statute allows municipalities to provide below-market housing to many
persons who are income-poor only because of predictable, short-term
life-cycle circumstances (e.g., students or young married couples) or be-
cause of sudden, temporary economic changes (e.g., recently divorced
108. The available data, while incomplete, shows minority underrepresentation to be a very
serious problem: "Many developments have very small minority populations and, within that
minority population, even smaller numbers of black residents. At least three Mount Laurel
developments appear to have no black residents; in some other developments the percentage of
black homebuyers varies from 1% to 3%." Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1256. This was not
an unforeseen development. Norman William, one of the lawyers for the original Mount Lau-
rel I plaintiffs, warned in 1975 that the predominant beneficiaries of the decision likely would
be white ethnic citizens. See Williams, supra note 89, at 95.
109. Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1232-33.
110. See id. at 1237 (discussing maximum incomes for different sized families, and provid-
ing a table showing income eligibilities from $10,621 (for a single-person family at 40% of
median) to $32,128 (for a nine-person family at 80% of median)).
111. The New Jersey Public Advocate has charged that COAH regulations on income ex-
clude more than half of New Jersey's moderate-income families and almost 75% of New
Jersey's low-income families from the effective reach of the fair share program. Initial Com-
ments by the Dep't of the Public Advocate upon the Proposed Substantive Regulations of the
Council on Affordable Housing, Stephen Eisdorfer, Ass't Deputy Public Advocate, June 30,
1980, at 4-6, cited in McDougall, supra note 78, at 640-41 n.I 11. This too, is not an unex-
pected development. See George Sternlieb, Mount Laurel, Economics, Morality And the Law,
in AFTER MouNT LAUREL, supra note 32, at 291, 296 ("Without deep and widespread subsi-
dies, Mount Laurel will enrich many landholders while making it possible to accommodate
more of the middle class ....").
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persons). In fact, a significant proportion of Mount Laurel beneficiaries
appear to fall into these relatively less needy categories.' 12
Additionally, the New Jersey statutes and regulations do not man-
date the bedroom size of housing units. Since many municipalities cor-
rectly calculate that smaller families place fewer demands on local fiscal
resources than do larger families with school-aged children, there is a
strong tendency to favor one-bedroom townhouses or other smaller units
that are inappropriate for larger families." 3 No serious attempt is made
to provide a proportionate number of larger units to meet the family
needs of the state's low- and moderate-income families.
A third principal flaw is that neither the New Jersey statute nor
COAH's implementing regulations obligate a municipality to engage in
any affirmative marketing of their units to low-income residents of urban
areas, or forbid a municipality from filling its fair share housing with
long-term, low-income residents." 4 While this deficiency might not be
fatal if COAH had calculated fair shares in a manner that accounted
fully for both a municipality's internal housing need and its share of the
112. See, eg., Hughes & VanDoren, supra note 80, at 105:
A peculiar distributional consequence of Mount Laurel policies arises because the
income guidelines take a static instead of a life-cycle view of income. At any point in
time, many young people are poor even though they will not have a low income over
their life cycle. These currently low-income but future middle-class citizens are ideal
candidates for Mount Laurel mortgages, although the absence of Mount Laurel
would simply delay rather than deny them homeownership.
See also Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1254 (observing that the occupations of Mount Laurel
participants "are very close to the national distribution of occupations by general category,"
with the largest single category being "[p]rofessional, technical, [and] managerial administra-
tive workers"); id. at 1259 (finding that Mount Laurel beneficiaries typically come from three
groups, "the temporarily poor.., mostly young people, some just out of college and in their
first jobs, and some recently-divorced women").
113. [Mlost of the low-income rental housing being produced is being produced for
senior citizens .... [Virtually no rental housing is being produced for younger low-
income households, including families with children, and these households are the
ones least likely to be able to take advantage of the larger quantity of sales housing
preferred by market-oriented private developers.
Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1214-15. The Public Advocate has faulted COAH regulations
for failing to prescribe a minimum number of multi-bedroom units, McDougall, Regional Con-
tribution, supra note 80, at 685 n.151, and for permitting developers to sell larger-bedroom
units to single-person households, thwarting the social end in having such larger units. Lamar
et al., supra note 80, at 1236.
114. Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1222-23 (discovering that among ten COAH-certified
municipalities that were studied intensively, most had formal criteria favoring applicants al-
ready connected with the municipality, such as municipal residents, employees in the commu-
nity, etc.). Once again, this pattern was forecast by earlier commentators. See, e.g., Franklin
et al., supra note 32, at 301 (stating that unless Mount Laurel housing is reserved for migrants,
it is "likely [to] ... be occupied primarily by lower income households already in or near the
jurisdiction.., or... moderate income persons familiar with the jurisdiction because they
already are employed there").
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regional need, many critics have argued that COAH's calculation of
overall need is far too low. As a consequence, many municipalities can
fulfill their fair share requirements without ever venturing beyond munic-
ipal boundaries to find low-income applicants, thereby defeating one ma-
jor objective of the original plan.115
Fourth, because of the scarcity of substantial state or federal housing
subsidies, New Jersey's approach relies very heavily upon the private
market for the creation of affordable housing.1 16 Unfortunately, for-
profit developers approach Mount Laurel obligations with the natural de-
sire to maximize their profits, not with a commitment to satisfy the
state's most compelling housing needs. Since economic conditions in the
mid-1980s promised greater potential profits from new homes than from
rental apartments, New Jersey developers used their density bonuses and
mandatory set-asides to build new homes, even though these units en-
tailed far higher consumer costs (substantial down payments, closing
costs, etc.) than would rental or rehabilitated units, and even though
these costs proved beyond the ability of many low-income persons to
pay." 7 Further, since the sale price of a Mount Laurel unit was pegged
to the successful applicant's income, developers attempted to sell units to
applicants who qualified at the very highest eligible income levels. Most
successful applicants had incomes just below the statutory maxima of
fifty and eighty percent of the statewide median income." 8
Finally, the program, as noted, contains no absolute requirement
115. See, eg., McDougall, Regional Contribution, supra note 80, at 684-85.
116. According to the 1983-1988 study of Mount Laurel programs, some 75% of all hous-
ing units completed were the products of market-driven, set-aside development. Lamar et al.,
supra note 80, at 1210-11. In their recommendations, these analysts urged a far greater finan-
cial commitment from the State of New Jersey:
Important as the inclusionary technique is, it is inherently limited; there can never be
enough demand for market rate housing to carry in its wake the amount of lower-
income housing necessary to meet the need. In addition, the type of lower-income
housing produced through inclusionary developments is likely always to be skewed,
to some extent, toward sales housing for households in the upper reaches of the low-
and moderate-income populations. Finally, the fact that a municipality must ap-
prove a far larger number of units in order to create the opportunity to meet its fair
share goals in this manner has always been seen as a problem by many municipalities
concerned about broad issues of growth and development.
Id. at 1268-69.
117. See, e.g., Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1261 ("Rental housing is the only possible
option for many low-income households who are unable to get financing or do not have
enough cash for down payments and closing costs .... [Yet r]ental housing for non-elderly
low-income households is almost non-existent in the Mount Laurel plans surveyed."); McDou-
gall, Regional Contribution, supra note 80, at 685 n.151 (noting that the New Jersey Public
Advocate has criticized initial COAH regulations for their failure to require a focus on rental
housing).
118. Hughes & VanDoren, supra note 80, at 104 (describing the "perverse notch effects" of
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that municipalities participate, and many have not done so, apparently
unconcerned by the prospect of facing "builder's remedy" litigation.11 9
Thus, municipal responsibilities for "fair share" are not distributed
fairly, and New Jersey, perhaps exhausted by the fifteen-year struggle for
a statewide statute, has taken no meaningful affirmative steps to enforce
the law against non-complying jurisdictions.
III. THE FEDERAL FAIR SHARE PLAN
A. Basic Features of the Program
Drawing upon both the positive and negative experiences in New
Jersey, Congress should craft a National Fair Share Act that would im-
plement the positive features of New Jersey's important and partially
successful, state-level experience. That act should take the traditional
form of a federal grant-in-aid statute20 that requires all states and locali-
ties wishing to receive various federal expenditures and other financial
benefits to comply with its terms. 2' It should follow the structure al-
ready in place under the Cranston-Gonzalez Affordable Housing Act of
Mount Laurel guidelines caused by developers who build units "affordable by people with
incomes just below the 50 and 80 percent levels").
119. Lamar et al., supra note 80, at 1266-67.
120. To avoid constitutional issues that might emerge if Congress directly imposed the
obligations of this Act, the statute should be structured as grant-in-aid legislation, under which
states and municipalities that choose not to meet the requirement of the Act will be excluded
from participating in the financial benefits of the federal program. Grant-in-aid programs have
been routinely employed by Congress since the 1930s to further nationwide compliance with
important policy objectives while simultaneously honoring state sovereignty and federalism
concerns reflected in the Tenth Amendment and the structure of the federal Constitution. See,
e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-98 (1937) (upholding the federal unem-
ployment compensation requirements of the Social Security Act of 1935 against contentions
that they unconstitutionally coerced state participation in the program and required states to
surrender their quasi-sovereign powers). Modem constitutional conceptions of federal-state
relations permit federal statutes such as the National Fair Share Act to "attach conditions on
the receipt of federal funds, and... employ[ ] the [spending] power 'to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with
federal statutory and administrative directives.' " South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206
(1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Berger, C.J.)).
The Court in Dole indicated that only four limitations constrained the federal spending power:
(1) it must be for "the general welfare," (2) Congress must signal to states in unambiguous
terms the conditions upon which their receipt of federal funds turns, (3) the conditions im-
posed on the states should be related to the federal interest in the program, and (4) the pro-
gram conditions should not otherwise violate an independent constitutional requirement. Id
at 207-08.
121. Some may question why Congress must act at all if a number of states already have
begun to address the issue. The answer is clear: Without congressional prodding most states
are unlikely to initiate meaningful reform. Even in New Jersey,
the state legislature was immobilized on the exclusionary zoning issue due to opposi-
tion by suburban lawmakers, who worked closely with the local officials elected in
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1990.122 At the federal level, the Fair Share Act should authorize a sub-
stantial sum of monies over a substantial period, perhaps five billion dol-
lars a year for ten years, to assist states and municipalities to implement
the act. It should also designate a lead agency to administer the Act,
granting it authority to promulgate implementing regulations. The lead
agency, probably HUD, should have the technical capacity to offer active
their towns. The New Jersey State Legislature thus avoided the problem of exclu-
sionary zoning until the New Jersey Supreme Court's rulings forced it to act.
McDougall, supra note 78, at 660. New Jersey's unusually activist state supreme court is
unlikely to be paralleled in other jurisdictions. In short, just as institutional paralysis pre-
vented state legislatures from addressing their reapportionment needs during the 1950s-a
paralysis not overcome until the federal judiciary intervened in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
237 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964)-paralysis prevents effective
state or local action against residential segregation today. A federal initiative is needed to
prompt states and localities to meet this national problem head-on.
122. Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12701 (1990)). As the
brief description below illustrates, much of the structure necessary to implement a National
Fair Share Act is already in place under the provisions of the Affordable Housing Act. That
Act presently requires all localities wishing to receive HUD funds to submit a Comprehensive
Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS). 42 U.S.C. § 12705(a)(1)-(2) (1990). The Act con-
templates that a CHAS will address, among other issues,
the jurisdiction's need for assistance for very low-income, low-income, and moderate-
income families, specifying such needs for different types of tenure and for different
categories of residents, such as very low-income, low-income, and moderate-income
families, the elderly, single persons, large families, residents of nonmetropolitan areas
... and other categories of persons residing in or expected to reside in the jurisdiction
that the Secretary [of HUD] determines to be appropriate.
Id. § 12705(b)(1). A local CHAS also must address the issue of local "tax policies affecting
land and other property, land use controls, zoning ordinances, building codes, fees and
charges, growth limits" and "describe the jurisdiction's strategy to remove or ameliorate nega-
tive effects, if any." Id. § 12705(b)(4). Additionally, a CHAS must discuss the local private,
nonprofit, and public housing institutions available to assist the municipality to meet its hous-
ing needs, id. § 12705(b)(5), as well as the expected non-federal sources of revenue upon which
it will rely to meet those needs. Id. § 12705(b)(6).
The Act then authorizes several billion dollars in appropriations for investment in afforda-
ble housing, principally rental housing for very-low and low-income families. Id. §§ 12722(1),
12724. It allows jurisdictions receiving the funds to employ them for acquisition of rental
units, new construction of units, substantial rehabilitation, and other expenditures at local
discretion, with a statutory preference for rehabilitation. Id. § 23742(a)(l)-(2). It also requires
localities planning federally-subsidized housing rehabilitation or new construction projects to
contribute 25% in local funds toward the total cost of rental assistance or rehabilitation
projects, 33% toward substantial rehabilitation, and 50% toward any new construction pro-
ject. Id. § 12750(a). In addition, states are required to set aside 15% of federal funds under
the HOME program for qualified community development organizations and other non-profit
housing providers. Id. § 12771.
Like Peter Salsich's proposals elsewhere in this Special Issue, the National Fair Share Act
would continue this decentralized process for decisionmaking on community housing needs, so
long as local plans prove consistent with overarching federal housing goals. See Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1619, 1637-39 (1993) (advocating the decentralization of HUD's spending decisions on hous-
ing programs).
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assistance to states and municipalities in their planning efforts, as well as
the power to enforce compliance with the statute.
The statute should require each state participating in the fair share
program to designate a central planning or development agency, like
COAH in New Jersey, to coordinate and oversee implementation of the
statute at the state level.123 State agencies should have the responsibility:
(1) to identify housing regions throughout the state; (2) to calculate the
extent of residential segregation124 and of low-income housing need in
123. This assignment of an important coordination and oversight role to the states is not
totally inconsistent with the relationships provided for by tle Affordable Housing Act. Under
that Act, HUD disburses 60% of its authorized funds directly to local governments and 40%
to the states. 42 U.S.C. § 12747(a)(1) (1990). States are required, in turn, to redistribute HUD
funds "throughout the State according to the State's assessment of the geographical distribu-
tion of the housing need within the State, as identified in the State's approved housing strat-
egy." Id. § 12752(b). Although the Act permits HUD to encourage coordination between
states and their municipal entities, it explicitly provides that a "local government shall not be
required to have elements of its housing strategy approved by the State." Id § 12705(d). The
National Fair Share legislation would modify that provision by subjecting municipal fair share
plans to state approval.
Why is this state oversight necessary? There are two reasons. First, most local munici-
palities operate under the influence of strong parochial interests that prevent them from ad-
dressing region-wide housing needs with impartiality:
The spatial fragmentation of land-use controls... means that no public body repre-
sents the interest of the metropolitan area as a whole. All governments with powers
over land use have parochial interests and focus their policies on serving only the
welfare of their own relatively narrow group of residents. In this governmental sys-
tem... [n]o entities exist that are motivated to formulate [metropolitan-wide] poli-
cies, and none have the legal power to adopt them....
This inherent parochialism is a crucial attribute of the U.S. policy environment
concerning land-use matters. Policies that require metropolitan area-wide perspec-
tives or behavior remain largely theoretical in most such areas because no real-world
organizations with much power will adopt them or can execute them. This is true
even though many of society's most pressing problems could only be effectively ame-
liorated by actions designed and carried out from a metropolitan-area-wide
perspective.
Downs, Policy Directions, supra note 26, at 715.
Once the need for oversight is clarified, the choice of overseers quickly narrows to either
HUD or a state agency. The task is too large for HUD or any other federal agency to do well.
Indeed, one contributing reason for the failure of the HAP program under the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 was that program's dependence upon HUD's review of
thousands of local plans, an administratively unrealistic burden.
This preference for state responsibility is consistent with the call by Professors Fainstein
and Markusen for adherence to "the principle of federal funding with state and local imple-
mentation." Susan S. Fainstein & Ann Markusen, Urban Policy: Bridging the Social and Eco-
nomic Development Gap, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1463, 1484 (1993).
124. Various measures might be developed to determine racial segregation, from the sim-
plest gross calculation of the disparity between the racial composition of the municipality
under consideration and the metropolitan region as a whole to very complex measures taking
dozens of non-racial factors into account. This proposal does contemplate, however, that a
municipality's "fair share" for racial purposes would approach some significant fraction of the
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each region; (3) to assign to each municipality a fair share of the ascer-
tained regional need;12 5 (4) to assist those municipalities that have not
created municipal fair share plans;126 (5) to monitor municipal compli-
ance with their fair share plans; (6) to supervise selection of tenants and
potential homeowners;1 27 and (7) to assure adequate re-rental and resale
overall metropolitan racial percentage. In a metropolitan region that is, for example, 35%
African American, a state planning agency might assign to a municipality that is 99% white a
ten-year African-American housing goal of 10%, assuming that no special circumstances af-
fected the municipality's growth prospects, its employment circumstances, its housing stock,
etc.
Of course, it would be crucially important in drafting the Act and its implementing regu-
lations to adopt clear standards to guide states in this allocation process, ensuring a meaningful
degree of actual desegregation. At this stage of the analysis, however, a precise determination
of the acceptable minimum percentages is a secondary consideration.
125. See infra notes 150-65 and accompanying text (discussing community alternatives).
126. Many municipalities, perhaps a majority, would not have any affirmative housing obli-
gations under this legislation since they already contain a substantial number of low- and
moderate-income housing units or are already racially diverse. Research suggests that munici-
palities and regions vary widely in their extent of residential segregation, with the Midwest and
Northeast the most segregated, and the South and the West the least so. See, eg., Reynolds
Farley, Residential Segregation of Social and Economic Groups.Among Blacks, 1970-80, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 274, 281-82 (Christopher Jencks & Peter E. Peterson eds., 1990),
This proposal, however, should not be interpreted to advocate that HUD confine all fed-
eral housing funds to municipalities with affirmative obligations under the National Fair Share
Act or restrict the ability of other needy municipalities-many of them larger cities-to receive
federal housing construction and rehabilitation funds. In the past, overreliance upon spatial
deconcentration as a criterion for HUD expenditures has led to justifiable criticism of HUD's
site selection criteria for federally assisted housing and similar provisions under the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974. See Calmore, supra note 32, at 9-18 (criticizing
HUD's 1972 site selection criteria and the HCDA of 1974 because of their severely adverse
impact on distressed urban minority communities).
127. Each state should designate state or regional entities to take applications from low-
income persons in various urban areas who are willing to relocate in municipalities that have
fair share obligations. At present, the Affordable Housing Act already requires each locality
receiving HUD funds to "make reasonable efforts to confer with appropriate social service
agencies regarding the housing needs of children, elderly persons, persons with disabilities,
homeless persons, and other persons served by such agencies." 42 U.S.C. § 12705(e) (Supp. II
1990). This requirement, however, does not establish any affirmative obligation to provide
housing for such persons or to look beyond municipal borders.
The Act should draw upon the successes of the Gautreaux Demonstration experiment,
which was first established under a settlement between HUD and plaintiffs in a Chicago law-
suit. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976). Under the settlement reached in that
case, HUD agreed to provide housing certificates that would supplement the rental payments
of inner-city residents and to support an office that counsels residents seeking to relocate to
rental housing throughout the metropolitan Chicago area. The program has been in operation
for over 15 years and has placed over 3900 families. See James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the
Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education and Social Integration
for Low-Income Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1993); James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J.
Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 126, at 342, 342.
Alternatively perhaps, very low-income applicants could be selected from volunteers
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restrictions. 128
To carry out these activities, each state should receive substantial,
new federal financial assistance that should meet their additional staff
and technical assistance requirements and allow planning assistance to
willing municipalities.129 States also should receive substantial federal
funds to implement lobal plans, and to be dispersed to municipalities,
local housing authorities, private non-profit housing corporations, fair
housing groups, housing trust funds, or others acting in furtherance of
state and local fair share objectives.1 30
Each municipality found to have an unmet fair share responsibility
should be obligated to: (1) choose a low-income goal or an integration
goal; (2) develop concrete plans for meeting the goal; (3) submit these
plans to the designated state agency for certification (subject to ultimate
federal agency review); and (4) once certified, take necessary steps to im-
plement the plan.
The Act should be framed to avoid the deficiencies of the New
Jersey fair share legislation. First, subject to the election options set
forth in Section III, the Act should require states and municipalities to
take explicit account of the racial composition of fair share households.
Second, the Act should require municipal plans to address the needs of a
broader distribution of low-income applicants, including a substantially
greater percentage of very-low-income applicants. States should also
prescribe housing goals by bedroom sizes, so that municipalities will be
able to accommodate the housing needs of large low-income, minority
among those who had successfully completed the education or employment training compo-
nents of the Family Support Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19), 607(b)(1)(A)(ii), 681-687 (1988).
Such an approach would provide an additional incentive for families with children in the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to complete their Support Act obliga-
tions, and it would assure a steady stream of very-low-income applicants to be placed in fair
share communities.
Under either alternative, the provision of well-supervised pre-screening and counseling
services should help alleviate suburban fears that the urban participants in such programs
would bring crime or anti-social values to their new communities. See DOWNS, supra note 22,
at 73-77 (noting that the fear of crime and aberrant social behavior by in-migrants are two
major white objections to racial integration).
128. As under the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, it would be necessary to provide resale or
re-leasing constraints in order to preserve the low-income character of housing units created by
market-related programs. Otherwise, a participant could simply resell a below-market unit at
the market price to a bona fide market purchaser, pocket the profit, and defeat the essential
purpose of the legislation. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-321f, -324 (West 1986).
129. The Affordable Housing Act already empowers HUD to provide.federal funds and
other assistance to create state and local technical and administrative capacity. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12781-12783 (Supp. 11 1990).
130. See infra note 157 and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 12747(a)(1) (Supp. I 1990).
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families, as well as smaller families and single persons."' Third, the Act
should require states and municipalities to select a substantial fraction of
recipients from beyond their municipal borders, drawn from lists to be
established in conjunction with social service agencies and administered
by the state agency.132 Fourth, states and municipalities should be en-
couraged to provide many more subsidized rental apartments via the re-
habilitation of existing units, Section 8 certificate placements, or public
housing. This encouragement would come through the Act's expansion
of federal housing subsidies, in addition to the stimulation of private, for-
sale units through density bonuses and other market-driven strategies. 133
Finally, it is critical for the Act to have unmistakable, strong incentives
to stimulate state and municipal cooperation.
B. Incentives for Compliance
The fair share framework creates myriad possibilities for delay and
evasion by municipalities motivated to resist the Act. To ensure its suc-
cess, therefore, strong federal incentives must be created to induce mu-
nicipal compliance. History teaches that, although necessary, positive
financial incentives alone will not induce many suburban communities to
131. These goals are already reflected in the Affordable Housing Act of 1990, although
they are not set forth as indispensable requirements there. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12705(b)(1), 12744,
12745, 12747(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 111990). The exact targets under the new Act should reflect the
proportionate income distributions, the family-size variations, and other pertinent characteris-
tics of the low-income population of each metropolitan area. For example, in areas where the
income distribution is skewed toward very-low-income citizens and large families, the propor-
tion of very-low-income citizens and large families targeted as participants in the program
should be greater than in metropolitan areas with different income characteristics.
States should be required expressly to disaggregate each category by race and ethnic ori-
gin and to assign overall housing goals in a manner that does not inadvertently disadvantage
African Americans or other ethnic minorities with different income or family-size characteris-
tics from other low-income participants in the program.
132. The New Jersey experience demonstrates the need to require affirmative outreach be-
yond the municipality's borders. However, the experience under HUD's Affirmative Fair
Housing Marketing Program strongly suggests that merely requiring developers of low-income
housing to market their units affirmatively to those "least likely to apply" is an insufficient
approach. See John M. Goering, Introduction to HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL
POLICY, supra note 24, at 202-05.
Instead, drafters of this legislation should require either an expansion of the Gautreaux
program, including the development of metropolitan-wide housing counselling and placement
services, or the development of low-income housing eligibility roles in coordination with state
and local agencies that administer the Family Support Act. See supra note 127.
133. This goal currently is reflected both in the graduated level of local matching contribu-
tions in the Affordable Housing Act of 1990-which require only a 25% local contribution of
local funds to receive federal funds for rental assistance and housing rehabilitation projects,
but a 50% local contribution to receive federal funds for new construction projects, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12750(a) (Supp. II 1990)-and in the AHA's provisions for federal targeting of funds. Id.
§ 12747(b)(1).
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participate in federal programs that could lead to racial or economic
dispersal. 134
Some policy analysts have recommended that noncomplying juris-
dictions be threatened with loss of all federal community development
funds.1 35 Numerous municipalities, especially in upper-income areas, re-
ceive little direct federal funding; for those communities, at least, the
threat would be hollow. 136 Moreover, extending the cut-off to other lo-
cally-received federal funds might prove counterproductive; many fed-
eral dollars currently flowing into municipalities are targeted for
programs that disproportionately serve lower-income residents (for ex-
ample, Title I educational grants 137). To deprive municipalities of these
funds would impose a disproportionately heavy burden on the municipal-
ity's low-income citizens. Indeed, many municipalities deeply resistant
to further economic and racial integration might well forego these federal
benefits and allow their indigenous low-income population to suffer
rather than assume their fair share obligations.
There is, however, another possible approach. Most suburban offi-
cials plausibly explain their resistance to low-income and fair housing
134. See, eg., Chandler, supra note 32, at 519 ("Suburban opposition to public housing is
evident in the relative absence of public housing authorities and units within suburbs."); id. at
523-524 (describing middle-income neighborhood resistance); Goering, supra note 132, at 206
(reporting that "[s]ome local jurisdictions have consistently evaded any responsibility to re-
house blacks in better quality, less segregated areas by simply not applying for federal funds");
see also Phillip L. Clay, The (Un)Housed City: Racial Patterns of Segregation, Housing Quality
and Affordability, in BLACK & WHITE, supra note 17, at 93, 99-100 (noting the failure of
federal rental voucher and certificate programs alone to disperse black families). George Gal-
ster's proposal to provide tax credits for those willing to make housing moves that would
promote racial integration is a variant of this idea, targeted to higher-income citizens. GAL-
STER, supra note 29, at 24. His program would be a welcome additional approach, but because
of acute federal budget constraints, it should not be the centerpiece of federal desegregation
and low-income housing efforts.
135. See Downs, Policy Directions, supra note 26, at 721-22. Michael Vernarelli has de-
scribed how HUD Secretary Romney attempted to induce more suburban communities to
participate in federal housing programs during the early 1970s by "mak[ing] the deconcentra-
tion of assisted housing within a metropolitan area a condition for local communities' receipt
of HUD housing and community development funds." Michael J. Vernarelli, Where Should
HUD Locate Assisted Housing?: The Evolution of Fair Housing Policy, in HOUSING DESEGRE-
GATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 24, at 214, 216-217. Vernarelli reports that "[tihe
get-tough strategy did not succeed, mainly because HUD could not offer most communities
enough of an economic reward to justify a local political confrontation over racial integration.
The most conspicuous failures were in suburban communities." Id. at 217 (quoting William
Lilley, III, Housing Report: Administration & Congress Follow Courts in Promoting Residential
Integration, 3 NAT'L J. 2434 (1970)); see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, HOUSING THE POOR:
THE CASE FOR HEROISM 31-41 (1978) (describing Romney's unsuccessful efforts during the
early Nixon Administration).
136. NORMAN WALZER & GLENN W. FISHER, CITIES SUBURBS, AND PROPERTY TAX
124-25 (1981).
137. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2711-2713 (1988).
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proposals as a reflection of "the will of their constituents."" '  Constitu-
ents, in turn, understandably (even if erroneously) explain their resist-
ance as self-protective economics.' 39  How can this link between
residential integration and potential economic loss be broken? My sug-
gestion is to revise two treasured features of the current tax system: The
homeowner mortgage interest deduction"4 and the local property tax de-
duction."' Together, these deductions provide to American property
holders indirect federal housing subsidies totalling some $81 billion each
year.'42 In municipalities refusing to establish and meet fair share goals,
the National Fair Share Act should progressively withdraw from prop-
erty owners these two tax deductions. The withdrawal would occur in
increments over a period of years-perhaps ten percent during the first
year of noncompliance, twenty percent the second year, and so on until a
complete withdrawal of the deductions would be in place after ten
years. 143
138. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 268, 279-80 (1990) (vacating contempt
fines imposed on city council members who refused to comply with federal housing desegrega-
tion orders and argued that they had both First Amendment rights and absolute legislative
immunity when discharging their legislative responsibilities to constituents who opposed
desegregation).
139. See Farley et al., supra note 17, at 336 (reporting that among the more than 400
whites in a Detroit survey who said they would move out of a neighborhood if it became at
least one-third black, about 40% cited concern about declining property values).
140. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988).
141. See id. § 164(a)(1).
142. James R. Follain & David C. Ling, The Federal Tax Subsidy to Housing and the
Reduced Value of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 147, 157 (1991). Some
economists suggest that it is preferable to think of the mortgage interest deduction not as a
federal subsidy for homeownership, but instead as the receipt of untaxed services from the use
of the taxpayer's home. See Susan E. Woodward & John C. Weicher, Goring the Wrong Ox: A
Defense of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 301 (1989). Woodward and
Weicher argue that the deduction has several important benefits, all of which would be lost if it
were abandoned. Id. at 301-02.
No matter how the deduction is viewed for other purposes, it is indisputable that deduc-
tions confer a valued, substantial benefit on homeowners, So long as the loss of the deduction
would affect the prices of homes in noncomplying municipalities negatively, the incentives
contemplated by the National Fair Share Act will do their intended work. As noted below, the
intent of this legislation is not to deprive taxpayers of the deduction, but merely to condition
its receipt upon municipal compliance with crucial federal housing policy.
143. This feature of the National Fair Share Act is a variant of a proposal for a "Pigovian
tax" put forward by Michelle White in 1979. White, supra note 1, at 210. Professor White
proposed to require local communities that wished to adopt exclusionary zoning regulations to
pay a tax to a regional governmental body. Id. at 225-30. Such a tax would reflect the external
costs, to nonresidents of the community, of the exclusionary zoning. Id. As Professor White
explained: "A standard economic remedy for nuisances is the Pigovian tax, which gives nui-
sance creators a choice between paying a tax per unit of nuisance or ceasing to create the
nuisance. The tax... is intended to discourage zoning by forcing the community to pay a
positive price for it. .. ." Id. at 210.
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Let me emphasize at once: The Act's objective would neither be to
end federal support for this important social policy nor to deprive any
taxpayer of these deductions.'" No withdrawal will or should ever oc-
cur in the vast majority of American municipalities-for the good reason
that most municipalities will comply with the terms of the Act. Further-
more, the graduated phase-in of withdrawals should allow taxpayers in
noncomplying municipalities ample time, before any significant financial
penalties have been felt, to persuade their reluctant public officials to co-
operate in framing a fair share plan.
Furthermore, any tax receipts generated by the loss of these deduc-
tions should not be returned to the general treasury, but instead should
be segregated by the Internal Revenue Service for eventual use in the
non-compliant municipality. Once returned, the money would be used to
support low-income housing or fair housing initiatives that would further
the objectives of the Act.'4 5 In other words, municipalities engaged in
non-compliance should be forewarned that they ultimately could not suc-
ceed in avoiding racial or economic integration. Citizens would be led to
understand that, despite their resistance, the indirect tax subsidies they
formerly enjoyed under the national tax policy would be recaptured and
redirected in their own communities in furtherance of another para-
mount housing policy-to foster communities that are racially and eco-
nomically integrated.
Beyond its deterrent value against municipalities contemplating
resistance, this tax approach has a second, greater function: It is calcu-
lated to transform the market incentives that currently work against de-
segregation. Because buyers or renters of equivalent homes in fair share
municipalities would continue to receive the considerable federal tax ad-
vantages destined to be lost by residents of resisting municipalities, mu-
nicipalities that refused to assume their fair share obligations would
become less financially attractive to many purchasers in a metropolitan
housing market. In consequence, property values in racially and eco-
nomically segregated communities would begin to fall, even as the overall
federal tax burdens borne by municipal residents began to rise. As a
144. In this sense, the National Fair Share proposal is less radical than the proposal put
forward by Peter Salsich, who suggests an absolute cap on mortgage interest deductibility and
who also appears to muse about the elimination of the property tax deduction. Salsich, supra
note 122, at 1634-36.
145. This idea bears some resemblance to Salsich's proposal for a Low Income Housing
Investment Trust Fund, since it would create a stream of revenue dedicated to low-income
housing construction. See id. at 1636-37. The principal difference is that the revenue here
would be redirected toward housing resources in the very communities whose residents had
forfeited their deductions because of municipal noncompliance with the Fair Share Act.
1993] 1609
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
result, distinct market advantages would shift toward those communities
actively pursuing integration.
This approach has one additional attraction. In the coming decades,
when federal budget deficits are likely to make new federal revenues diffi-
cult to find, 1" it would "create" new dollars for low-income and minor-
ity housing by redirecting toward communities and programs that foster
low-income and minority housing needs the flow of federal subsidies that
are currently received by homeowners and property holders in communi-
ties determined to resist integration.
In addition to the powerful individual, tax-based incentives for com-
pliance, the Act also should contain municipal sanctions by denying fed-
eral dollars for community infrastructure, community development, or
housing purposes that would otherwise be destined for non-compliant
municipalities. 147 Municipalities in active noncompliance also should be
declared ineligible to issue municipal bonds free of federal taxation.148
Although these municipal sanctions alone would not likely prompt com-
pliance with the fair share proposal, they would surely provide useful
additional motivation, beyond the losses faced by resident taxpayers, to
impel municipal compliance.
Finally, if a state were to refuse to cooperate with the fair share
program, the Act should require the forfeiture, not only of the state's fair
share funds, but also of other federal funds designated for the develop-
ment or improvement of municipal infrastructure149 or for state infra-
structure improvements, such as highways or bridges, that would
otherwise assist segregated states in maintaining their racial or economic
exclusivity.
Let me end this section by reemphasizing that the objective of these
proposed sanctions would not be punitive. Instead, they would be
designed to prompt compliance and to alter the views of market actors
about the relative attractiveness of segregated and integrated communi-
146. See, eg., Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty:
An Alternative View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 126, at 437, 453-55 (noting that
federal budget constraints during the 1990s are likely to be fierce due to the projected annual
deficits and the large national debt).
147. See, eg., DOWNS, supra note 22, at 161-62 (advocating establishment of effective local
low-income housing programs as a prerequisite to receipt of various types of federal financial
assistance); Downs, Policy Directions, supra note 26, at 741-42 (advocating establishment of
effective local anti-racial-discrimination programs as a prerequisite to receipt of federal com-
munity development block grants).
148. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 141-150 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
149. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5306(d) (1988 & Supp. H 1990) (allocating 30% of federal Com-




ties. Yet they should convey federal determination that no federal funds
should be expended in furtherance of residential living patterns that have
proved to be unnecessarily destructive to the social, economic, and edu-
cational prospects of millions of citizens of the United States.
IV. LOCAL FAIR SHARE OPTIONS
Under this Act, municipalities should be given a choice of pursuing
racial or low-income housing objectives, since racial discrimination has
both racial and economic dimensions, and since both must be addressed
simultaneously to make meaningful progress on either.1 50 Some com-
mentators have advocated attacking residential segregation merely by
providing (or permitting) more suburban low-income housing units,
often with the expectation that African Americans, because of their dis-
proportionate poverty, would be the chief beneficiaries of such pro-
grams.15 ' In effect, both Mount Laurel and New Jersey's Fair Housing
legislation have followed such an approach. Because of the nation's
widespread, unmet need for affordable housing, however, municipalities
operating under such plans can and, as New Jersey's experience con-
firms, often do meet their low-income housing goals without any benefit
to minority citizens.1 52
On the other hand, analysts who propose to confront residential seg-
regation directly, by establishing race-specific goals, l5 3 face several diffi-
cult questions. William Julius Wilson and other researchers have argued
that race-conscious remedies that ignore economic differences rarely
reach those lower-income blacks with the greatest need, instead almost
invariably benefitting those African Americans who already possess the
highest incomes, the most assets, and the greatest mobility.15 4 The adop-
tion of race-conscious residential goals also raises serious constitutional
150. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1990) (authorizing federal funds for use by
states in construction of primary and secondary highways); id. § 144(e) (authorizing federal
funds for state bridge replacement and rehabilitation); 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988) (authorizing
federal funds for state urban mass transit programs).
151. See, e.g., Paul Davidoff & Linda Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary
Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 509, 528-32 (1971); Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary
Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Hous-
ing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432, 1438 (1974).
152. See Boger, supra note 6, at 1331-34.
153. See, e.g., Michael F. Potter, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities: Societal
Housing Patterns and a Proposal for a 'Racial Inclusionary Ordinance,' 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1151, 1196 (1990) (advocating the adoption in California of a mandatory set-aside statute that
would require developers of new residential housing projects to reserve 25% of all sale or
rental units for racial and ethnic minority group members).
154. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 109-24 (1987).
1993] 1611
1612 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
and statutory questions; scholars and courts have long wrestled with
whether public housing authorities and residential communities may
constitutionally engage in "integration maintenance"-the self-conscious
monitoring of, and interference with, housing markets to assure racial
and ethnic stability in a community.1 5
The National Fair Share Act attempts to avoid the problems of ra-
cial "ceiling" quotas by relying upon carefully crafted "floor" goals in
municipalities throughout each metropolitan region. The Fair Share Act
should require state planning agencies to calculate both (1) low-income
housing need and (2) the racial and ethnic composition of each region. It
would then calculate both a municipality's low-income goal and its racial
goal, dependent upon various demographic factors, including the extent
to which the demographic composition of the municipality departs from
155. Many commentators have emphasized a distinction under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment between minimum, or "floor," quotas for racial minori-
ties, which guarantee some minority presence, and maximum, or "ceiling," quotas, which limit
minority presence in the ostensible interests of maintaining integration. See, e.g., Bruce S.
Gelber, Race-Conscious Approaches to Ending Segregation in Housing: Some Pitfalls on the
Road to Integration, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 921, 950-60 (1985) (arguing that "floor" quotas and
affirmative marketing may be constitutionally permissible, but that "ceiling" quotas are uncon-
stitutional and violate the Fair Housing Act); Polikoff, supra note 24, at 47-56 (supporting the
constitutionality of race-conscious, affirmative counseling programs for homeseekers); Sander,
supra note 14, at 926-28 (arguing that floor quotas, but not ceiling quotas or race-conscious
assignments in a public housing context, might be constitutional if they are temporary); Note,
Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government Policies to
Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REV. 938, 947 (1980) (contending that benign
steering of white homeseekers, but not benign ceiling quotas, would be constitutional); Note,
Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Transition, 90 YALE
L.J. 377, 380-399 (1980) (arguing that benign steering of white homeseekers would be consitu-
tional); cf Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial
Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245, 270-309 (1974) (defending both floor and ceiling
quotas, albeit on different constitutional grounds); Dom Bishop, Fair Housing and the Consti-
tutionality of Governmental Meaures Affecting Community Ethnicity, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1229,
1246-65 (1988) (arguing that all forms of integration maintenance devices, including floor and
ceiling quotas and affirmative marketing, can survive constitutional and statutory scrutiny if
they are narrowly tailored so that their integrative benefits outweigh their costs); Rodney A.
Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the 1980's, 58 S. CAL.
L. REv. 947, 980-99 (1985) (arguing that all integration maintenance devices are unconstitu-
tional and violative of the Fair Housing Act).
The Supreme Court has not addressed these issues in a housing context, and the lower
courts are divided on their constitutionality. Compare Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
484 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding a plan to maintain racial integration in a public
housing project by limiting minority participation to 40% of the units) with United States v.
Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir.) (condemning use of racial ceiling quotas for
minority applicants to federally-subsidized housing project, despite their prior approval as part
of a court-supervised settlement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) and Burney v. Housing
Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746, 753 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (striking a race-conscious tenant assignment
plan that had the effect of preferring white applicants).
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that of the metropolitan region as a whole."5 6 The Act should then give
each municipality an option whether to attempt to meet the state-desig-
nated low-income goal, the racial goal, or perhaps a "mixed goal" (which
would delegate a municipality to designate percentages of both low-in-
come units and of racially integrated units. Such a provision should re-
quire a sliding scale, with a proportionally smaller low-income housing
goal for municipalities that agree to seek a greater percentage of minority
residents, and vice versa). Different communities would choose to pur-
sue one of these options after assessing such factors as their present
demographics, their rate of housing development (and, therefore, the
likelihood of achieving low-income housing goals through market-driven
density bonuses or set-asides), the funds available from federal, state, and
local sources to build subsidized rental housing, nonprofit housing devel-
opment, etc. For example, older municipalities lacking undeveloped land
for new development, and without adequate federal, state, or local funds
to subsidize low-income renters in scarce, high-rental apartments, might
be drawn toward racial integration goals. This approach would lead
such municipalities to establish and support local fair housing groups, or
perhaps to engage in affirmative marketing, or conduct real estate semi-
nars to instruct local realtors on how best to comply with fair housing
laws.157 Such communities might reason, moreover, that middle- to up-
per-income black professionals and managers ultimately would be more
desirable neighbors and more reliable taxpayers than lower-income resi-
dents of any race.""
Younger communities undergoing strong private residential devel-
156. Jargowsky and Bane recently illustrated how widely demographic patterns and
changes differ among various metropolitan areas. Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto
Poverty in the United States, 1970-1980, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 126, at 235,
269-70.
157. These are among the activities proposed by George Galster and others as prerequisites
for community receipt of federal funds. See GALSTER, supra note 29, at 25. One intended
virtue of the National Fair Share approach is its clear placement of responsibility to identify
effective desegregation methods on municipal decision-makers themselves; unless the methods
they adopt actually work to meet the municipality's fair share goal, serious adverse conse--
quences will automatically follow. Thus, municipalities will be strongly motivated to select
effective remedies, rather than to delay or make remedial choices that, while formally ade-
quate, will not achieve meaningful results.
158. Some researchers have suggested that contacts between members of different racial
and ethnic groups have a far greater likelihood of success if the parties are of roughly equal
educational and income status. See, e.g., Yinger, supra note 26, at 292 (observing that
"[c]onflict between participants and residents will be minimized.., where the residents' in-
come and preferences are as similar as possible to the participants' income and preferences");
Denton & Massey, supra note 16, at 797 (noting that "the early Chicago school theorists...
believed that the level of segregation reflected the social distance between groups... [and] that
socioeconomic advancement by ethnic groups would lead to their progressive integration in
society").
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opment, by contrast, might decide to make greater use of market forces
to meet low-income housing goals, and thus to concentrate on low-in-
come housing production. In either case, the Act would draw on the
resourcefulness and common sense that local municipalities always bring
to those problems they want to solve, rather than those they want to
avoid.
Lower-income housing goals typically would be more expensive to
implement, since they would involve some form of subsidized housing.
Racial integration goals, by contrast, could be met in many communities
without municipal housing subsidies by developing affirmative market
programs designed to induce black homebuyers or renters to choose
housing there. The bias of the selection process would thus tend to favor
racial integration goals; indeed, if the program worked ideally, many mu-
nicipalities might well find themselves in an informal competition to offer
more attractive housing options to minority homeseekers throughout the
region.
Presumably, if the program worked as hoped, the need for integra-
tion maintenance would diminish substantially. At present, many ob-
servers have noted that suburban municipalities that welcome minority
residents risk resegregation as a disproportionately large number of mi-
nority homeseekers and renters, frustrated by encounters with realtors
and brokers practicing discrimination in other municipalities, turn to the
"open" community.159 Yet, if African-American homeseekers were truly
afforded a wide variety of housing choices, it is likely that their residen-
tial choices would become less skewed toward a handful of compliant
communities and instead would be distributed more widely throughout a
metropolitan region, based on individual employment choices, school
choices, or other non-racial characteristics. 160
The Act possibly could provide for a third option not fully explored
in this Essay. In some metropolitan regions, chiefly in the South and the
West, metro-wide government is the rule; schools, housing authorities,
municipal hospitals, and other public services are shared throughout geo-
graphically extensive areas. 61 Under such circumstances, low-income
159. See GALSTER, supra note 29, at 11-12.
160. If blacks begin to appear in all or most neighborhoods-even if in small num-
bers-the widely accepted notion that the entry of a few black households into a
neighborhood or community signals the start of a certain process that must end in
that neighborhood or community becoming an all-black slum will become less
credible.
John F. Kain, Housing Market Discrimination and Black Suburbanization in the 1980s, in
DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 16, at 68, 82; see also Sander, supra note 14, at 901.
161. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FISCAL DISPARI-
TIES: CENTRAL CITIES AND SUBURBS, 1981, at 11 (Aug. 1984) (noting the difference between
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residents and racial minorities are not invariably deprived of adequate
public goods by the pattern of balkanized local governments so prevalent
in the Midwest and Northeast. 162 Since the proposed legislation, as ob-
served above, will assure its beneficiaries access only to a municipality
itself, not to any particular neighborhood, there is some merit to the ar-
gument that an urban area that chooses to govern itself regionally, and to
distribute its public goods and services to all within the region, already
has achieved most of what the Act aims to accomplish. 163
Yet it is possible to imagine metro-governments, unitary in formal
terms, that are subdivided administratively into segregated units for edu-
cational, health care, and other purposes so as effectively to deny low-
income and minority citizens access to average public goods and services.
If so, the formal citizenship in the overall metro-government would not
suffice to meet the integrative goals of this Act.
Moreover, both the proposed low-income goals and racial integra-
tion goals implicitly promise new or rehabilitated low-income housing
resources, an outcome that would not follow from the metro-government
option. In a nation still deeply in need of additional low-income housing
resources, 1 " this might prove a decisive factor in assessing whether to
include a metro-government option in National Fair Share legislation. 165
"Eastern" metropolitan areas, characterized by stark contrasts between central cities and sub-
urbs, and "newer" cities of the South and West, which have used aggressive annexation to
create cities with "substantial suburban characteristics"); David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs,
NEW DEMOCRAT, May 1992, at 17, 18-19 (indicating the changes in metropolitan areas in the
United States between 1940 and 1990 that have created "cities without suburbs").
162. David Rusk reports that cities which have aggressively annexed their surrounding
suburbs "have avoided segregation by race and economic class better than others," and that
"creating a more open society also seems related to maintaining broad public institutions, such
as the dominant city or county governments, or county-wide school systems, which link 'city'
and 'suburb.' " Rusk, supra note 161, at 19.
163. Anthony Downs anticipated this possible solution in 1973:
Admittedly, opening up the suburbs is not the only way to counteract existing fiscal
disparities. One much simpler remedy would be dissolving the political boundaries
that fragment each metropolitan area and creating a single metropolitan government.
This has been done in Indianapolis, Nashville, and Jacksonville.
DOWNS, supra note 22, at 40.
164. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES/Low INCOME HOUSING INFORMA-
TION SERVICE, A PLACE To CALL HOME: THE Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS CONTINUES
3-4 (1991) (reporting that in 1989, the difference between the number of low-income house-
holds and the number of available units was 4.1 million, a much wider gap than at any point
during the 1970s).
165. Furthermore, since a major purpose of the National Fair Share legislation is to over-
come residential segregation's role in creating a "spatial mismatch" that prevents urban racial
minorities from reaching areas of suburban job growth, a metro-wide government could meet
this objective of the Act adequately only if it provided a mass transit system to city residents
that would afford ready access to major metropolitan employers. See Kain, supra note 13, at
450 (evaluating the research findings in support of the spatial mismatch hypothesis).
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V. CONCLUSION
A National Fair Share proposal would not directly provide jobs,
health care, preschool education, larger welfare benefits, or other crucial
social services to those who need them most. 166 Nor would it directly
address the desperate need of our beleaguered cities and their residents
for aid with their immediate problems. Yet pilot programs such as the
Gautreaux experiment demonstrate that a successful fair share program
would afford multiple, substantial benefits to most fair share partici-
pants. 167 Moreover, by creating housing options for low-income and mi-
nority citizens in suburban areas, the fair share program should diminish
the pressure for, and thereby lower the market price of, urban housing
units. It should also widen the employment choices of urban residents,
reduce pressures on overcrowded urban school systems, and spread the
local costs of social services among municipalities throughout each met-
ropolitan region.
Apart from these more concrete gains, a fair share program would
gradually, over the course of a decade, begin to redirect America's cur-
rent drift toward economically homogeneous, racially segregated, mutu-
ally antagonistic geographic areas. One of the most important
achievements of American society has been its ability to provide mean-
ingful social mobility for millions of lower-income citizens. This social
fluidity, though failing millions who find themselves locked into almost
insurmountable poverty, nonetheless has lifted millions more into mid-
dle-class status, forestalling the crystallization of deep, destabilizing in-
ter-class antagonisms like those that plague less mobile societies. The
National Fair Share legislation should serve these basic American social
goals.
Some have worried that "dispersal" strategies might undermine
hard-won minority political control of many cities throughout the coun-
166. In a series of helpful articles, George Galster has attempted to unravel the multiple,
complex causes of minority poverty, a "web of mutually reinforcing connections in which
elements serve both as causes and effects." George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, and Race,
71 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1422 (1993); George C. Galster, A Cumulative Causation Model of the
Underclass. Implications for Urban Economic Development Policy, in BLACK & WHITE, supra
note 17, at 190, 191; George C. Galster, Research on Discrimination in Housing and Mortgage
Markets: Assessment and Future Directions, 3 HoUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 639, 639 (1992). Gal-
ster's analysis strongly reinforces the argument that no one policy prescription alone can abate
the forces or heal the multiple injuries from American racial subordination of its African-
American citizens. Nonetheless, the Kerner Commission's analysis, to which I largely assent,
strongly suggests that ending residential segregation for a substantial fraction of today's urban
minority population could have useful long-term benefits for individuals, for cities, for the
suburbs, and for the nation as a whole.
167. Rosenbaum et a., supra note 127, at 1552-56.
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try.1 68 Such concerns overestimate the likely dispersal effect of even the
most successful fair share program, with a purpose not to depopulate
cities or scatter their entire low-income and minority populations, but
only to ensure that some fraction of the poor and middle-income minori-
ties trapped in central cities have the choice of suburban living, and that
suburban communities do not become so economically homogeneous
that their residents lose all political and economic motivation to support
national policies that benefit poor and minority citizens. 169 It is almost
certain that the population of America's largest cities would remain dis-
proportionately African American, Latino, and Asian even if some re-
population of urban areas by some whites accompanied the end of the
current segregation.
Since 1968, we have lost nearly an entire generation of poor and
minority children, cut off from adequate medical care, adequate schools,
decent housing, and mainstream labor markets. 170 It is no idle charge
that segregative forces presently are contributing to the perpetuation of a
social and economic "underclass."' 17 1 While at this writing no political
168. See, e.g., Wilhelmina A. Leigh & James D. McGhee, A Minority Perspective on Resi-
dential Racial Integration, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note
24, at 31, 36 (contending that "[t]o the extent that the movement of blacks from cities to
suburban areas reduces their numbers in inner-city voting jurisdictions, they are reducing their
power as the plurality or majority of voters in certain wards"); Georgia A. Persons, Racial
Politics and Black Power in the Cities, in BLACK & WHITE, supra note 17, at 166, 185-87
(arguing that "[tihe politics of suburbia is both strongly anti-city and heavily racially tinged,"
putting suburban blacks at a decided political disadvantage). Cf Norman Krumholz, The
Kerner Commission Twenty Years Later, in BLACK & WHITE, supra note 17, at 19, 25-31
(arguing that black urban power is a "prize of substantial value to the African-American citi-
zens of a city, and a prize worth fighting for").
169. Anthony Downs long ago observed that there might be some political advantages to
an increasing black political presence in suburban communities:
[T]he presence of at least some black residents in most suburban areas would greatly
reduce the probability that white suburbanites would define suburban interests in
ways that are antiblack as well as anti-central-city. Black suburbanites would be able
to exercise at least some beneficial influence that would not arise if nearly all blacks
remained in central cities.
DowNs, supra note 22, at 82. See generally Robert Reinhold, The Electorate; Chasing Votes
from Big Cities to the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at Al, All (examining the demo-
graphic realignments following the 1990 census and their implications for the political and
racial loyalties of suburban politicians).
170. See generally ALEX KOTLOwITz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF
Two Boys GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991) (chronicling two years in the lives
of two "underclass youths" growing up in inner-city Chicago); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,
S.O.S. AMERICA! A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET (1990) (advocating a "peaceful transfor-
mation" to an America that ensures no child will grow up without health care, food, shelter, or
education).
171. See generally Erol Ricketts, The Underclass: Causes and Responses, in BLACK &
WHITE, supra note 17, at 216 (focusing "on some of the major agreed on causes of the under-
class and the expected direction that the responses motivated by subscription to these causes
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consensus has emerged to reverse these devastating trends, our national
experience provides remarkable examples of transformative political mo-
ments when genuine, far-reaching reforms previously considered un-
thinkable have been adopted with broad popular support.172 The fair
share legislation proposed in this Essay is designed for such a period of
national reconstruction, with the hope that it might one day contribute
to a reversal of the ominous threat to our national future that is posed by
residential segregation.
would take"); WILSON, supra note 154, at 6-8 (noting the causes of the social and economic
dislocation of the "ghetto underclass").
172. See generally W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880
passim (Meridian Books 1964) (1935) (describing the legislative and social achievements of the
post-Civil War Reconstruction era); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1877: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTIONpassim (1988) (same); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COM-
ING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933-1934 passim (1958) (describing the legislative achievements of
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal); Michael B. Katz, Reorganizing the Nation, in IN
THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 206, 206-
47 (1986) (describing the broad social welfare reforms adopted during the New Deal of the
1930s); Taylor, supra note 48, at 1701-17 (describing the significant legislative achievements of
the civil rights era of the 1960s); PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A REVIEW OF THE 1964-
1974 DECADE 47-188 (Robert D. Plotnick & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1975) (describing Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty programs).
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